Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures, Number 2 by Friedrich, Carl Joachim et al.
Connecticut College 
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College 
Connecticut College Books Linda Lear Center for Special Collections & Archives 
1948 
Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures, Number 2 
Carl Joachim Friedrich 
Arthur Meier Schlesinger 
Alpheus Thomas Mason 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/ccbooks 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Linda Lear Center for Special Collections & Archives at 
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Connecticut College Books by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact 
bpancier@conncoll.edu. 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. 
HENRY WELLS LJ\.WRENCE MEMORIAL LECTURES NUMBER II 
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: 
LECTURES ON THE AMERICAN LIBERAL TRADITION 
HY 
CARL JOACHIM FRlEDRICH 
HARVARD UNIVl·RSllY 
ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR. 
HARVARD UNJVrRStn• 
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON 
PRINCFTON UNIVFR<;JTV 




HENRY WELLS LAWRENCE MEMORIAL LECI1JRES NUMBER TI 
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: 
LECTURES ON THE AMERICAN LIBERAL TRADITION 
BY 
CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR. 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON 
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT 
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE 
1948 
Copyright, 1948, by 
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE 
NEW LONDON PRINTING CO., INC. 




The Patte rn o f Democratic Chang e i
n th e  Unite d States: 
Andre w Ja ckso n 
and Franklin Delano Ro sevel t  . 
Arthur Meie r Schlesing er, Jr., Auocial e  Pro feu or o f HiJ /O rJ, 
Harvard U11frer1ity. 
The Problem of the Democratization of Ge rm an y . 
Ca
rl 
Joachim Friedrich, Pr ofe 11o r o f Go v emm en l, 
Harµard U11iver1ity. 
Variations on the Liberal Theme . 
Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCorm ick Pro feu or of 
f11r i1pm
dence, 









The Henry Wells Lawrence Lectureship was founded in 1944 as a 
memorial to Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Chairman of the Department of His­
tory and Government at Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. The lecture­
ship was established by friends, colleagues, and former students of Dr. Lawrence 
"to bring to the campus annually a scholar in the broad field of history who will 
present bis subject in the spirit of the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence 
was devoted." 
The present volume contains the second, third, and fourth lectures deliv­
ered under this foundation. 
The first annual lecture, "The Problem of International Security: Historical 
Backgrounds," was delivered by President Charles Seymour of Yale University, 
an old friend and fellow student of Dr. Lawrence's, on February 27, 1945. It 
was published together with representative essays from Professor Lawrence's 
pen, as Volume I of the Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures. 
The lectures in the current volume are all concerned with the American 
liberal tradition, either with its domestic aspects or with the contemporary 
attempt to extend it into an erstwhile authoritarian state. 
The second lecture, delivered on February 26, 1946, by Arthur Meier 
Schlesinger, Jr., now Associate Professor of History at Harvard, analyzes the 
"pattern of democratic change" during the eras of Andrew Jackson and Frank­
lin Delano Roosevelt. 
The third lecture, delivered on October 24, 1946, by Carl Joachim Fried­
rich, Professor of Government at Harvard, contains a first-hand report of a 
recent trip to Germany where Professor Friedrich advised American Military 
Government authorities and conferred with German political leaders on their 
attempts to establish constitutional governments in the several states of the 
American occupation zone. 
The fourth annual lecture, delivered on October 30, 1947, by ·Alpheus 
Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence of Princeton Univer­
sity, discusses some of the variations that have developed within the American 
liberal tradition. Drawing in part upon his long study of the career of Louis 
Dembritz Brandeis, Professor Mason presents here an analysis of certain types 
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of liberal thought and action that have developed in the United States during 
the past seventy-five years. 
Together, these essays do much to illuminate the complexity of American 
democratic liberalism and to explain its continuing vitality. At the same time 
they suggest the difficulties that Americans face overseas when they attempt to 
transmit it via military government to peoples of a somewhat different cultural 
heritage. Presented originally to undergraduates, these lectures are offered now 
to a wider public in the hope that they will promote an appreciation of the 
theme to which they are addressed. 
CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER, Editor 
Chairman 
HANNAH GRACE ROACH 
GEORGE HAINES, IV 
R. EDWARD CRANZ 
HELEN MULVEY 
Department of History 
II. 
THE PATTERN OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
ANDREW JACKSON AND FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 
BY ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. 
The life-and-death problem for any society is the problem of change. This 
world of ours is basically an unstable world ( or so the experience of recorded 
history suggests, and a generation which has split the atom can hardly offer 
contradiction). Every society to survive must make an endless series of adjust­
ments, large and small, trivial and cataclysmic, to the endless series of changes 
in its environment. 
Change, this generation has concluded, can be for better or for worse. The 
Victorian faith in progress has disappeared along with the cabriolet and the 
hansom cab; and even the Victorians never believed in the inevitability of 
short-run progress. But we have lost the animal faith in the long-run progress. 
Our generation is dazzled by images of disaster. Our Utopias, whether 
chromium-plated and hermetically sealed like that of Mr. Huxley, or rising 
from the rubble of a world-shattered by suicidal war like that of the late1 
Wells, are gloomy Utopias. Our Utopias in practice, one may add, are even 
gloomier because they are real. Our attitude toward change is no longer 
innocent and joyous. We gamble neither on its not taking place nor on 
its taking place for the better. And, let no one mistake it, the twentieth cen­
tury is like the sixteenth-a century of transition and transvaluation, of despair, 
fanaticism and war, a century when the world is cut loose from old moorings 
and seeks desperately for new. 
We thus have a grave responsibility to understand what change is about, 
why it must come, and what forms of change are, in the highest sense, legiti­
mate. We can neither oppose change without discrimination nor accept it 
without discrimination. We must avoid both the suffocation in the blind alley 
and the wild leap into the black abyss. Our job is to focus what feeble and 
flickering light we have to pick out the insecure path along the edge of 
catastrophe. 
In this century the issues of change will probably present themselves under 
a political guise. To understand the process of political change we must under­
stand first of all the role of the ruling class. 
Every society has a ruling class, whatever its pretensions, whether to democ-
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racy or even to classlessness. The social character of that class has changed 
according to circumstance from the priesthood to the armed warrior, from the 
capitalist to the bureaucrat; but its function has remained the same. It may be 
briefly defined as that class which benefits from the continuance of the existing 
order, an i it so benefits because the existing order is set up to supply it with 
power and prestige. 
The rest of the community tends in time to grow increasingly dissatisfied 
with its Jot. The length of the period of tolerance depends on the wisdom, 
efficiency and vigor of the ruling class. But, as that class fails increasingly to 
sohe the greatest economic questions, as it fails to hold the political loyalty of 
large sections of the community, as it fails to recruit promising outsiders and 
thus drives them into opposition, so its position becomes increasingly pre­
carious. It is soon faced by new problems of production and subsistence, less 
easy than those it met when it first came to power; and it is confused, in addi­
tion, by that treachery of the soul which has insured that every ruling class 
known to history, whatever the objectives with which it came to power. has 
ended by becoming much less interested in those objectives than in power itself. 
Thus the question of change becomes imperative. An enlightened ruling 
class can relieve the pressure by making concessions, though these concc�sions 
will soon involve the partial loss of power to the opposition. A wise ruling 
class, like the British, renews itself from below by a steadr and patient process 
of absorbing the most vital elements among the ruled. A tough rul ng elm 
like the Soviet liquidates its opposition; and it looks as if the Soviet rulers may 
be wise as well. The introduction of universal education under state control 
provides an admirable mechanism for spotting able men at an carlr age and 
tapping them for the Communist Party, lest they become disgruntled and tum
to opposition. The recent action of the Communist Party in conferring mem­
bership upon great numbers of war veterans is another measure de�igned to 
assimilate all powerful groups to the ruling class. 
The invention of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
n,dc possible a new stage in our approach to these questions. Democracy seeks 
to solve the problem of change by abolishing the ruling class. The attempt at 
abolition has proved abortive; the ruling class has persisted in a new and less 
obvious form; but democracy did mean, at least, a blurring of class lines. 
Though the ruling class has an effective existence, it no longer has a legal or 
statutory existence. A democracy has no equivalent for an hereditary nobility 
with governing power, or for a single party enjoying a political monopoly. It 
is thus easier to cross the tracks in a democracy. The process of recruitment is 
less _c�mplicated and formal. The ruling class, no longer stiffened by a special
tradition or by a peculiar status, can make the accommodation to change more 
harmoniously and quietly. 
A second contribution made by democracy to the problem of change has 
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been a more mature conception of legitimate change. Our margin for maneuv­
ering is wider; a greater range of possibilities exists within constitutional bounds, 
changes which thus invoke neither the specter of revolution nor the terror of 
repression. The ruling class can no longer cope with opposition by off-the-cuff 
violence or by secret police without jeopardizing its whole moral claim to 
govern. 
Democracy has further devised political techni9ues to express and regul:i.r­
ize its solution of the problem of change. The secret ballot, the parliament, the 
di\ ision of powers, the fixed elections-all these are established to make sure 
that political change comes about in an orderly manner. 
The broad result has been to create a flexible political and social structure, 
in which the premium is placed on tolerance, bargaining and compromise-a 
structure which has on the whole brought about a steady education of the ruling 
class to the necessities of change and at the same time has kept alive enough 
hope for discontented minorities to deter them from taking up the option of 
revolution. 
Democracy itself was the expression of a fundamental change in property 
relations; and its apparatus for the peaceable solution of its internal problems 
has never been brought to its crucial test-that is, another fundamental change 
· in property relations. It is widely believed-it is, for example, a premise of
Leninist thought-that no such fundamental change would be possible without
armed resistance by the ruling class and thus violent revolution from below.
Yet the resources of democracy may be greater than some suppose. In 
Great Britain today we are observing the phenomenon of a majority government 
elected on its promise to interfere basically with property relations; and it is my 
guess that the Labour Government will be able to go very far indeed before the 
Parliament gives way to the barricades. Great Britain is a nation of substantial 
and tenacious libertarian traditions. But so, I hope and believe, is the United 
States. 
Democracy in the United States has had one conspicuous failure. That 
failure is, of course, the Civil War, the great tragedy of our history; and an 
understanding of the Civil War makes clear certain limitations of the demo­
cratic solution. The questions which brought on the Civil War were not class 
questions but sectional questions. When views are held strongly, exist across 
class lines, and are concentrated in special areas, the problem of conciliation is 
no longer an internal problem of bargaining, jockeying and compromise. It 
becomes virtually a problem of foreign relations; and, when the resources of 
diplomacy are exhausted, the alternative is war. Democracy could not have 
avoided the Civil War because the majority solution would have been imposed 
by one section on the other and would have been resisted as a species of foreign 
aggression. 
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Yet, for all the conditions working against sharp social struggle, there
have been two periods of acute class tension in the United States. The two 
periods have been the age of Andrew Jackson and the age of Franklin Roose­
velt. These were the periods when popular dissatisfaction with business rule 
was strongest, when the dissatisfaction found voice in a broad coalition directed 
under vigorous presidential leadership against the business community, and 
when the ruling class itself became most bitter and implacable in its resistance 
to change. 
Jackson and Roosevelt were one hundred years apart-a long time in a 
country with as short a history as the United States. The face of America had 
changed almost beyond recognition in this period. The population bad multi­
plied, the area increased, and a century of science and invention had transformed 
the tempo of American life. Yet in the pattern of democratic change the age 
of Jackson and the age of Roosevelt present curious and instructive parallels­
parallels all the more significant because of the contrast between tl1e pastoral 
simplicity of life under Jackson and the frightening complexity of life in the 
twentieth century. 
It is worthwhile to inquire in some detail into the nature of these par­
allels, and the inquiry may cast useful light on the character of democratic 
change. Both Jackson and Roosevelt came into power as beneficiaries of wide­
spread discontent. Both succeeded a conservative regime which had shown 
itself conspicuously unable to cope with tl1e sources of this discontent. It is 
probably only a meaningless coincidence that each succeeded a relatively high­
minded and intelligent conservative, personally cold, politically inept, but neither 
stupid nor corrupt. John Quincy Adams, it should perhaps be noted in justice, 
had his sights half trained on a future which few of his contemporaries were
able to appreciate, while Herbert Hoover was enslaved by economic theories 
invented one hundred years before his birth and hardly valid then; but, in their 
relations to the situations which overthrew lliem, they played corresponding 
roles. 
Similarly there are surprising personal resemblances between their suc­
cessors. Both Jackson and Roosevelt could be described as country squires. 
Jackson's fine plantation, the Hermitage, was as remote from the cabins of the 
small farmers and the hovels of the city workers as Roosevelt's mansion at 
Hyde Park. Both ·were lawyers by profession, neither a very good nor successful 
lawyer, and both had military instincts and experience-Jackson in actual army 
command, Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the navy. 
Both were men of personal charm and presence, but neither bad displayed 
particularly firm or profound political views before llieir elections. Sickness 
played an important part in both lives. Where Roosevelt's character was recast 
by his bout with infantile paralysis, Jackson's was subjected to the ordeal of 
constant, nagging illness in the White House. The fact of illness may not have 
been unrelated to the immense capacity both developed for intuitive understand-
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ing of the people. Both had a faculty for judgment, of tactics as weU as of 
policy, to which the experts with which each surrounded him�lf alv.-a)·s 
deferred. 
On the whole these personal resemblances between Adams and Hoover, 
Jackson and Roosevelt, may be dismissed as inconsequential, with the exception 
perhaps of the fact that both Jackson and Roosevelt were more or less members 
of the class which they attacked. Strictly speaking, they were renliers and not 
businessmen, but their natural affiliations were surely with the con�c:rvatil'e 
party. My suspicion is that the leadership of successful liberal movements in 
this country will continue for some time to come from the upper middle cla� 
or the aristocracy. 
Both men faced unprecedented presidential problems. Consequently each 
had to improvise and experiment with policy and with personnel. Each found. 
moreoYer, that a concerted attack on problems of such novelty required the 
expansion of executive power. The presidency entered a new phase with 
Jackson, who made clear for all time that the executive would be the dominant 
arm of the government; and Roosevelt developed the resources of presidential 
leadership to the highest point in our history-a fact symbolized strikin_i:ly by 
the fourth term. 
Each too found it necessary to resort to certain executive devices unknown 
to the Constitution. Both discovered, for example, the inadequacy of the 
cabinet as an instrument for policy guidance. The cabinet is inevitably selected
in response to an intricate political and geographical calculus designed to pro• 
vide all important factions in the party and regions in the country with a feeling 
of representation in the government. It may be a satisfactory enough policy 
instrument in normal times; but, when problems are urgent and unprecedented, 
it is not likely to supply the qualities of imagination and disinterestedness which 
the executive will require. 
These qualities include a militant reform drive, which can come only 
from a basic dissatisfaction with the existing order, a lack of ambition, a com· 
pJete personal devotion to the executive, and an absolute loyalty to the cause. 
Thus both Jackson and Roosevelt relied for their most intimate advice and 
bestowed their most confidential assignments upon a small group of men 
endowed, in the modern phrase, with a "passion for anonymity." Amos Ken• 
dall, Francis Preston Blair and others constituted Jackson's Kitchen Cabinet, as 
Har� Hopkins, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Benjamin V. Cohen and Thomas
Gardmer Corcoran and others constituted Roosevelt's Brain Trust. It is of 
interest that the two closest to each president-Kendall and Hopkins-were 
men whose chronic ill health may well have created special bonds of sympathy 
with the presidents. 
Some of these men-like Kendall and Hopkins-eventually emerged from
the shadows to become cabinet members; and, in each case, certain cabinet
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members, like Martin Vao Buren and Roger B. Taney, or Henry Wallace and 
Harold Ickes, enjoyed the familiar status of brain trusters. 
Harriet Martineau's paragraph on Amos Kendall in 1834 is still the classic 
description of the brain truster in operation. "He is supposed to be the moving 
spring of the whole administration; the thinker, the planner, and doer; but it is 
all in the dark. Documents are issued of an excellence which prevents their 
being attributed to persons who take the responsibility of them; a correspond­
ence is kept up all over the country for which no one seems answerable; work 
is done, of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes men look about 
them with a superstitious wonder; and the invisible Amos Kendall has the 
credit of it all." 
In 1838 a Southern Democrat who had broken with the administration 
because of its radical economic policy-a type not perhaps unknown today­
said in the House of Representa�ves of Amos Kendall, "He was the President's 
thinking machine, and his writing machine-ay, and his lying machine! ... 
he was chief overseer, chief reporter, amanuensis, scribe, accountant general, 
man of all work-nothing was well done without the aid of his diabolical 
genius." 
Another phenomenon, the probably unvoidable by-product of the brain 
truster, is the frustrated brain truster-the man who goes down to Washington 
fi.lled with ideas, gains momentary access to the president, is eventually thrown 
out, and then revenges himself by writing a book exposing the administration 
which refused to follow his advice. Thus Robert Mayo wrote two bitter little 
books revealing the vile purposes of the Jackson administration and, in par­
ticular, denouncing the person and plans of Amos Kendall, whom he must 
have regarded as his more successful competitor. 
At the start, the executive will get cooperation from the Congress, because 
the Congress is fairly fresh from the people and recognizes the pressures for 
change. But the experience both of Jackson and Roosevelt suggests that, as 
the president continues to press his reform program, the Congress will become 
more and more the voice of conservatism. Both Jackson and Roosevelt had 
increasingly strained relations with Capitol Hill. Jackson's veto of an act to 
recl1arter the United States Bank-an act, as his opponents incessantly pointed 
out, passed by a majority of both houses-precipitated the first all-out attack 
on bis administration and supplied the leading issue in the campaign of 1832.
His relations with Congress grew steadily worse in his second term. He used 
the veto power more than all the presidents before him had together used it­
as a result of which he was widely denounced as un-American, undemocratic 
and dictatorial by those whose political and economic interests stood in his line 
of fire. After the removal of the government deposits from the Bank, the 
Senate actually passed a resolution charging the president with having violated 
the Constitution. When Jackson replied by a long protest, the Senate refused 
to enter it in its records. The passing of this resolution of censure represented 
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a worse impasse between the executive and legislative departments than ever 
existed in the age of Roosevelt, in spite of the statements in recent years of 
self-appointed constitutional experts to the effect that relations between the 
President and the Congress have never fallen so low in our history. Experience 
suggests that no strong executive can avoid tangling with Congress, and also­
if we observe Mr. Truman-that a weak executive can hardly avoid it either. 
The chief reason that a vigorously democratic president wilJ be opposed 
by large elements of the Congress is that special interests can always expect a 
welcome somewhere on the Hill, especially when the door is closed to them at 
the White House. The situation is complicated by the fact that the pre�ident 
to sustain his position must, like Jackson and Roosevelt, appeal over the heads 
of Congress to the people. This very strategy always appears to some to threaten 
the constitutional prerogratives of Congress-an objection which can only be 
based on the curious theory that the Congress is the exclusive representati\'e of 
the people. 
This question of constitutional prerogative supplies the champions of 
special interest with a much nobler platform from which to attack a democratic 
president. They concentrate on this issue; and sometimes they persuade others 
to work themselves into a state of honest anxiety over the supposed threat to 
constitutional ways. My guess is that the lather over the Constitution is pretty 
much a phoney. You can see today that senators and representatives who were 
alleging lofty constitutional fears of dictatorship as grounds for fighting Roose­
velt's measures are now just as vociferous when the measures are spcnsored by 
a man who, whatever he is, is certainly not a dictator. The same thing happened 
when Van Buren succeeded Jackson. 
You may expect further that in any period of rapid democratic change 
the executive will run up against, not only the Congress, but also the Supreme 
Court. The president always inherits his court, which means that it has been 
appointed either by his conservative predecessor or by some liberal president at 
such a remote time that the liberal justice has long since turned consef\'ative. 
Justice Story was appointed to the Court by James Madison, just as Justice 
McReynolds was appointed by Woodrow Wilson, but Jackson and Roose\·clt 
found them as unsatisfactory as the designates of more conservative presidents. 
There are strong tendencies toward conservatism inherent within the court. Its 
powerful but ambiguous constitutional position presents constant temptations 
to enlarge that position. Io any case conservatism is implicit in the very nature 
of the law, in the very process of judicial decision in terms of precedents. 
Thus a dash is inevitable. As Jackson had the more dramatic fight with 
the Congress, so Roosevelt had the more dramatic fight with the Court. The 
scope of federal legislation had of course expanded greatly by the age of Roose­
velt, so that the Court could obstruct Roosevelt's legislative program as it could 
never obstruct Jackson's. Death intervened more favorably also on Jackson's 
behalf, and he was able to put his own men on the Court without resorting to 
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extreme measures like the Roosevelt court bill of 1937. His appointments had 
about the same reception as Roosevelt's. When Jackson chose Roger B. Taney 
to succeed Marshall as Chief Justice, the opposition was as violent as the recent 
opposition, say, to Hugo Black. Said one conservative newspaper, 'The pure 
ermine of the Supreme Court is sullied by the appointment of that political 
hack." 
The first reactions to the Court as reconstituted by Jackson were not unlike 
the first reactions to the Court as reconstituted by Roosevelt. Chancellor Kent, 
the most eminent conservative jurist of the time, remarked in 183 7, "When we 
consider the revolution in opinion, in policy, and in nwnbers that bas recently 
changed the character of the Supreme Court, we can scarcely avoid being re­
duced nearly to a state of despair of the Commonwealth." Or is this a quotation 
from some pronunciamento of the American Bar Association a century later·? 
Well, the commonwealth always survives. Very few justices can long 
resist lhe inherent tendencies toward conservatism. 
The conilict between president and court, it should perhaps be added, is 
not just an unfortunate by-product of a determined liberal administration. It 
is an essential part of the physiology of our system; it is the natural and whole­
some process by which the tissues of the Court are restored before they are 
fatally injured. Without the occasional struggle with a strong executive, the 
Court would probably succumb wholeheartedly to the temptation to take over 
legislative functions; and popular protest would soon set firm constitutional 
limitations upon its power. The present system has periodically reminded the 
Court-as Roosevelt's attack reminded Chief Justice Hughes-to undertake its 
own program of self-discipline. The Court has thereby maintained its place at 
the apex of our government. 
Thus a fighting executive, surrounded by a corps of intimate advisors 
devises a program to meet the pressures for change; and in so doing he runs 
athwart both of the Congress and of the Supreme Court. Those whose eco­
nomic position is menaced by the program will rush to defend the coordinate 
bodies, unfurling the banner of high constitutional principle to conceal the 
actual motives of opposition. I have said that the executive wiU crack his log­
jam by appealing over the heads of both bodies to "the people." This appeal 
is fundamental to his success; and the question next arises: who are the people 
who respond to this appeal? 
Here again, when the facts are examined, a surprising resemblance is to be 
discovered between the age of Jackson and the age of Roosevelt. This resem­
blance has been too long obscured by the two theories of the source of Ameri­
can democracy which have dominated our national imagination. These theories, 
which arose in different periods but which reinforced and complemented each 
other, may be called the Jefferson theory and the Turner theory. The Jefferson 
theory is briefly that American democracy was born on the small freehold, that 
it is essentially a rural phenomenon; and the Turner theory is that it was born 
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in the wilderness, that it is essentially a frontier phenomenon. Whatever Ameri­
can democracy is, these theories agree, it is not, like European radicalism, the 
product of a conflict among the classes created by the Industrial Revolution. 
Both views, one operating as a fundamental moral axiom, the other as a 
fundamental historical interpretation, have satisfied profound national nee<ls­
the need in particular for establishing the uniqueness of the American experi­
ence and thereby of protecting the United States from analogies drawn from 
Europe. Both contain serious elements of truth. But, in both cases, the theories 
have been developed out of all proportion to the actualities which underly them. 
They have been partially transformed into myth; and, in their complete state­
ments, they are to be understood as portions of the national myth, not as deli• 
nitive explanations of the actual origins of American democracy. They are to 
the facts much as the Garden of Eden is to the Darwinian theory. 
The theories of Jefferson and of Turner make little sense, for example, 
when compared with the facts of the New Deal. This perhaps does not prove 
anything, since many persons regard the New Deal as itself the product of 
European radicalism. But they make little more sense when compared with 
the facts of the period which has been long regarded as the classic demonstra• 
tion of the truth of the theories--that is, the age of Jackson. Modem scholar­
ship has shown that the controlling beliefs and motives of Jacksonian democ· 
racy came predominantly from the East and South rather than from the frontier, 
and that some of its characteristic measures emerged directly out of the class 
conflicts in the industrial Northeast. 
Take, for example, the question of the Bank. Jackson's war against the 
Bank has long been loosely ascribed to the frontier's instinctive democratic 
hatred of a great financial institution. Yet, when you analyze the sources of 
opposition to the Bank, it becomes quickly evident that there were two main 
grounds of dislike. Some people opposed the Bank because it restrained the 
free issue of paper money by local banks. Others opposed it because it issued 
paper money at all. The first ground was the characteristic frontier ground; 
it was the natural preference of a debtor region which stood to gain by inflation 
and which, in fact, had already fought with the United States Bank over this 
very question. The second ground-the so-called "bard money" position­
was the natural preference of wage-earners, who stood to lose by any downward 
fluctuation in the value of money. These two incompatible parties joined io 
the crusade against the Bank. But, when the smoke died down, it became clear 
that Jackson and his administration were fighting the Bank for hard money 
reasons, not for frontier reasons. The final test was to come when the Jack• 
sonian policy was presented to the West without the glamour of the Hero of 
New Orleans. The West never gave very ardent support to Martin Van Buren. 
The basic backing for the Jacksonian program thus did not come, as his­
torians in the Whig-Republican tradition have claimed, from a rabble of rough 
backwoodsmen, clad in buckskin and flourishing Bowie knives. It came from 
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a broad popular coalition made up of various and somewhat disparate groups, 
united by their dislike of business rule. Who were in this coalition? A varie­
gated assortment, including intellectuals, writers, trade unionists, small farmers, 
small businessmen, city machine politicians, members of the Democratic Party 
organization ( not least its Southern elements), and even some large business­
men who could not identify themselves with the leadership of the business 
community. 
There are certain points worth noting here. The alliance of bossism and 
reform, for example, obviously did not begin when Roosevelt first accepted the 
support of Frank Hague, nor the participation of labor in politics when John 
L. Lewis contributed to the Democratic Party war chest in 1936. The political
activily of the writers is another significant phenomenon. In normal times
writers are non-political folk; but they are among the first to feel restless and
uneasy when times get out of joint; and, since verbalization is their business,
they play vital roles in awakening and guiding public opinion. When the
intellectual class goes in for political criticism, it means that the existing order
is losing its foundation in faith and loyalty. It is an evidence of impending
crisis as unmistakable as a temperature of 101 in a medical thermometer. Jack­
son, for example, had behind him Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Cullen
Bryant, Walt Whitman, James Fenimore Cooper, George Bancroft, Washington
Irving and most of the leading authors of his day. They not only voted for
him, but they identified themselves with party activity and some took jobs in
the government. There was no such mass participation of writers in politics
again until Franklin Roosevelt succeeded equally well in capturing the imagi­
nation and loyalty of the writers of the nineteen thirties.
Jackson and Roosevelt had the same enemy--the ruling class, the business 
community-and, in each case, the business community went through the same 
process of what can only be described as nervous breakdown. It was in power 
and did nothing to solve existing discontents. Then it went out of power, began 
to resist attempts on the part of the democratic opposition to solve. these dis­
contents, failed again, and next descended into the psycboneurotic stage of 
opposition. 
lo this phase business hysteria transfigures the president into a raving 
dictator, a madman foaming at the mouth, a sick man whose reins of leadership 
have fallen to a clique of sinister but obscure advisors, or whatever bogeyman 
conservative fantasies demand. (There is a distressing lack of originality from 
one century to another in the folklore of conservatism.) Similarly the reform 
program is transformed by fevered imaginations from measures, generally in­
nocuous in retrospect, designed to plug up a few holes in the capitalist economy, 
into a vast and criminal conspiracy, aimed at private enterprise, democracy and 
the American way of life, to end with the annihilation of business, the destruc­
tion of religion and the nationalization of women. 
"For the first time, perhaps, in the history of civilized communities, the
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Chief Magistrate of a great nation ... is found appealing to the worst passions 
of the uninformed part of the people, and endeavoring to stir up the poor 
against the rich." ··we are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but 
rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the 
Government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man." 
"Though we live under the form of a republic we are in fact under the absolute 
rule of a single man." "The message is a heartless, cold-blooded attack upon 
our most valuable and most cherished classes of citizens." "The people, the 
country, the business men have nothing to hope from the message, (the Presi­
dent), or any of his clan." "What, then, sir, is the policy of the administration? 
... For myself, I believe it to be . . . a war of extermination on commerce and 
the cur rency." "All the calamities of war with the most potent power on earth 
wouJd be a blessing compared with the consequences of this measure." "Our 
business is disappearing like the melting snow ... The manufacturers of New 
England are baffled, crippled and desponding and beyond endurance.'' "THIS 
REPUBLIC WAS NEVER IN GREATER DANGER THAN AT THIS 
MOMENT!" 
These quotations happen to be from the eighteen thirties, not the nineteen 
thirties. But any student of the political writings of Governo r Bricker, Mr. 
Herbert Hoover, Mr. George Sokolsky, Mr. Westbrook Pegler or Colonel 
McCormick of the Chicago Tribt(ne could match these quotations, sentiment by 
sentiment and almost word by word. 
After a few years, of course, the hysteria dies down. The American way 
of life turns out not to be so fragile as the business community thinks. Democ­
racy, far from being weakened, comes out stronger and more afo·e than before. 
Even business continues prosperously at the same old stand. These hallucina­
tions of disaster are characteristic of a feeble and insecure ruling class. Few 
British businessmen today, facing a Socialist government, are remotely as 
alarmed as American businessmen were when faced by the much more conserva­
tive New Deal administration. 
The exhaustion of conservative hysteria, as life simply fails to live up to 
nightmare, accompanies also an exhaustion of the reform impulse. After a 
time, in any government, temptation begins to take over. The original reform 
objectives give way to the desire to stay in power. Jackson and Roosevelt were 
the great dominating personalities; when they were removed from the scene, 
their followers began to quarrel among themselves, their movement to disin­
tegrate. We have observed this phase in Washington over the past two years. 
Some leave to take well-paying business positions, like Jackson's Amos Kendall, 
who ended as the great entrepreneur of Western Union, and Tom Corcoran, 
Thurman Arnold, Lauchlin Currie and many New Dealers today. As the party 
becomes set in its ways, its internal paths to power a re choked up. Energetic 
younger men tend to join and revitalize the opposition, like W. H. Seward and 
Thaddeus Stevens a century ago, or the WiUkies and Stassens today. They are 
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opposed within the conservative party, by the Websters and Rufus Choates or 
by the Tafts and the Brickers, but eventually they will win. When men who 
have learned the lessons of reform take over the leadership of the business 
party, the period of rapid change is over. 
This is the basic pattern of democratic change in the United States. On 
the content of the programs, the differences between Jackson and Roosevelt are 
greal. 1t was one of Jackson's triumphs, for example, to pay off the national 
debt-an achievement which is the occasion for the annual celebration of Jack­
son Day by the Democratic Party. Indeed, so far as the responsibilities and powers 
of government are concerned Roosevelt and modern liberals are much more 
in agreement with Hamilton and John Quincy Adams than with Jefferson and 
Jackson. But the question of the content of the measures is not the key ques­
tion. The key question is for whose benefit are the measures employed? What 
are the social sources of the support? And here the answer is identical for 
Jackson and for Roosevelt. One may conclude that the fundamental impulse 
of democratic change, the basic meaning of American liberalism, is an impulse 
on the part of the other sections of society to restrain the power of the business 
community. 
It should be noted that this is an essentially conservative impulse. The aim 
of Jackson and of Roosevelt was to preserve capitalism-if necessary, from the 
capitalists themselves. For this reason some observers, not incorrectly, regard 
our class conflicts as sham conflicts since they are not aimed at altering basic 
property relations. It is a question of perspective whether you regard the 
Jac.ksonians and the New Dealers as a brighter and abler wing of the ruling 
dass, or as a genuine opposition. From the viewpoint of the business com­
munity, they certainly represented a genuine opposition; but, as we have seen, 
this is likely to be a shrill and nervous viewpoint. 
Nevertheless the Jacksonians and the New Dealers never represented a 
revolutionary opposition. They never challenged the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech, free press, free assembly and due process; indeed, they have 
generally tried to reinvigorate these guarantees. Any movement which operates 
in this sense within constitutional bounds is full in the American democratic 
tradition, no matter how much it may offend current prejudices of the business 
community or threaten corporate concentrations of economic power. A move­
ment which rejects these guarantees--or favors them only so long as it remains 
a minority-a Commwust or a fascist movement-is not in the American demo­
cratic tradition. But we must never forget that the business community will 
infallibly charge every honest democratic movement with rejection of those 
guarantees, with Communism or fascism. These are serious charges in a democ­
racy. Experience suggests that they should be regarded with extreme suspicion 
when they come from persons with economic stakes in the political battle. 
It is essential for us to understand fully the pattern of democratic change. 
In a few years we may well experience a terrific economic crisis. When this 
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crisis comes, the problem of preserving our democracy will be at its most acute 
phase. We will need every weapon in our arsenal. The total release of our 
energies will require in particular a complete and exact understanding of what 
our democratic tradition is; what the methods and purposes of American democ­
racy have been; what, in hard historical fact, our political resources are. 
The future crisis will probably bring a new version of the Jackson situa­
tion, of the Roosevelt situation. An energetic democratic leader will attempt 
to push through measures designed to secure the stability o( the country. These 
measures will inevitably threaten vested interests. They will be fought as 
Jackson and Roosevelt were fought under the same rallying cries. We have 
seen that the facts of history disclose that part of the pattern of democratic 
change is a shrill scream of protest from the respectable conservati\·e elements 
of the nation. When this scream comes again, we must be prepared for it 
and see it in its correct proportions. When a great corporation buys full pages 
in newspapers across the country to claim that some minor adjustment is going 
to mean the death of the American way of I ife, this should be regarded as an 
exercise in ritual for the edification of the faithful, not as a serious contribution 
to political discussion. So long as the democratic movement remains honestly 
in the tradition of Jackson and of Roosevelt, it will be no more a threat to the 
American way of life than they were. Indeed, it will probably again represent 
that re-infusion of militant democracy essential for the preservation of our way 
of life. 
Our democratic tradition is big and resourceful. Given time and space, it 
can solve the problems which confront us. We may take heart, in addition, 
from the present British experiment where a government is conducting the 
most perilous operation of all-a revolutionary change in property rel ations 
without a revolution. Thus far there has been no violence or terror, no secret 
police, no curtailment of the historical British liberties, no restrictions on the 
free play of democracy. The next decade in Britain may well contain vital 
lessons for our own future. These will be lessons which our own ever-growing 
democratic tradition must assimilate and return to its own uses. 
History can aid significantly in inculcating that vivid sense of the poten­
tialities of our democratic tradition-the tradition which can yet save us. If we 
know
_ 
precisely wherein the American past has been strong, we can face the 
Amencan future without fear. 
III. 
THE PROBLEM OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF GERMANY 
BY CARL J. FR1EDRICH 
Mr. Chairman, fellow students, and friends, I ought to thank your chair­
man for his very gracious introduction. It certainly is a privilege to speak here 
under the foundation commemorating Professor Lawrence, and I would con­
gratulate the committee upon its third choice because I am neither as distin­
gwshed as President Seymour nor as brilliant as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; so I 
am just what Aristotle called "the fair mean." 
The problem of how to develop a sound and viable democracy in Germany 
is of absorbing interest to all Americans. I am happy to discuss the issue here 
tonight because I have had a most challenging opportunity to catch a glimpse 
of the inside of that development during this past summer. For at the invita­
tion of American military government authorities I spent several weeks assisting 
them in the work they were engaged in: to guide the Germans in the American 
zone in re-establishing constitutions in the three states or Laender of Bavaria, 
Hesse and Wurttemberg-Baden. Since these constitutions are about to be 
adopted. we can consider the whole program with some perspective. It should 
be born in mind, however, that when I speak of Germany in the following 
pages, I am usually referring to the American zone of Germany.I 
Originally, I had been very much at variance with American official policy 
and disinclined to participate in what seemed to me an undertaking betraying 
old and established American ideals. But to help leading American occupation 
officials solve the problems involved in constitution-making in our zone and at 
the same time to help those Germans who were engaged in that enterprise 
understand the American point of view, seemed to me an enterprise to which 
one could justifiably devote oneself as an American liberal. 
Let me preface what I have to say by an introductory observation. Many 
Americans at present show a renewed interest in Germany out of a rising 
1 The American initiative in establishing these constitutions, or rather requiring the Ger­
mans in their zone to establish them, was soon followed in the Soviet zone, where con­
stirntions were adopted around the first of the year 1947, and in the French zone which 
adopted constitutions in the course of April and May. Only the British zone has not to 
date (December, 1947) completed this work, but in all the Laender of the British zone 
constitution-making is actively going forward. 
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antagonism to the Soviet Union. This seems to me regrettable, and not io 
keeping with our professed aim of democratizing Germany.2 Nothing seems 
to frighten democratic Germany as much as the growing hostility between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The correspondents who report that this 
development is playing into the Germans' hands are mistaking aJI Germans for 
Nazis. Democratic Germans don't see it that way and there is no realistic basis 
for assuming that they would. On the contrary, the most anxious question that 
every German put to me when he got a bit intimate was: Is it really true that 
you are planning to attack the Soviet Union? And when I would assure them 
quite firmly and with considerable conviction that such was by no means the 
case and that I considered it quite out of the question, and on the contrary 
believed that our country would make every effort to avoid a war-like conflict 
with the Soviet Union, it came every time as a profound relief to the person 
with whom I was talking. 
Democratization is one of the five D's that characterize our pol icy in Ger­
many today. It's rather kind of fate that it has provided five D's to describe 
these policies, because it makes it easier to remember them. These policies, as 
delineated in the Potsdam Agreement are: demilitarization, denazification, de­
centralization, deindustrialization and democratization. They are very important; 
they are all, in fact, essential; but our truly significant policy from the point of 
view of permanent and lasting peace on this earth is democratization. One of the 
difficulties with democratization is that it is obviously linked to ideological prob­
lems which provide ample sources of disagreement with the Soviet Union. \Vie 
did not disagree with the Soviet Union on demilitarization; we both wanted 
to get rid of the general staff, we wanted to get rid of the army organization, 
and we wanted to get rid of war industries. There was no problem here. We 
did not disagree a great deal over deindustrialization at first, although lately the 
Soviet Union has adopted the policy of reparations from current production 
which the United States rejects. Also we disagreed somewhat on deoazification, 
and I shall have a little more to say about that later. But on decentralization 
and democratization we really disagree a great deal, and the reason is that the 
concept of democracy which the United States stands for and believes in is 
quite different from the conce_pt of democracy that the Soviet Union stands for 
and believes in. 
Now, as long as we are in the United States and the Soviet Union is in 
Russia, we �an get out of the difficulty by saying, "Well, let us recognize that
each goes his own way and never mind about what the other is doing." Some·
2At -�e �me _this_ lectu�e was delivered Professor Reinbold Niebuhr had just published an
Utt_c e 10 Li/ e 1n which he stated it as his convictioo that the purpose of the Soviet 
010d ":as to conq_uer all of Europe. Besides disagreeing with this, I pointed out thJt 
our a mimstra tors 10 Germany did not proceed on this assumption then. 
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times there may be difficulties but they can be overcome. But in Germany we 
are both together in the same place, and we are both committed to democratiza­
tion. You can't say .. Let each go his own way" unless you are willing to make
one assumption which we are precisely not willing to make, and that is that the 
zonal boundary between the Soviet and the American and British zones becomes 
an iron curtain on the one side of which is a country belonging to Western 
Europe. If we reject such a permanent division,-and we do, because it is 
contrary to American policy,-then we are in for a continuous period of argu­
ment and controversy with the Soviet Union on the related problems of demo­
cratization and centralization. We might just as well face this. 
I think that it is rather silly to assume that because you have serious con­
flicts of interest with a country, you are necessarily going to go to war with it. 
I don't suppose that many of you here have ever studied the relations between 
the United States and Britain after the War of 1812 with a view to comparing 
them to our relations with the Soviet Union today. If you did this you would 
find that there was the same kind of fierce mutual suspicion you now find in 
our relations with the Soviet Union, yet both countries after 1812 had come to 
the conclusion that there was no point in fighting each other. Both govern­
ments had made up their minds that they were not going to go to war against 
the other and they never did again. That is very significant because they kept 
on scrapping but they scrapped without going to war. And I would like to 
submit to you that we are going to scrap a great deal with the Soviet Union but 
somehow I seem to feel in my bones that we are not going to go to war with 
them over it. We're just going to go on scrapping. And as we find that we 
can scrap and compromise and then scrap again we are going to get accustomed 
to the thought that it is possible to be quite at loggerheads and still go on. One 
of the places where we are going to do most of the scrapping is Germany, and 
one of the issues on which we are going to do most of the scrapping is demo­
cratization ( including decentralization). 
Before I go any further in this theoretical analysis, vitally related as it is to 
the whole problem of constitutional development, I would like to give you­
just by way of an indication of where I went-a brief sketch of the tour of 
duty I made. Before entering Germany I had been to England and talked 
there with some of my old friends and with some of the people involved in 
the British occupation. I had also gone to France and talked to a number of old 
friends there. Then I went to Switzerland where I talked at Geneva and at 
Zurich to the university students about our own foreign policy, which is one 
of the gravest issues in Europe today. Everybody is looking toward the United 
States and everybody is worrying about the United States, and a good many of 
our people do not help it a bit by talking very irresponsibly when traveling in 
these countries.a I entered our zone from Switzerland,-froro the back door, so 
8 Cf. "As the Swiss See It," Atlantic Monthly, November, 1946.
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to speak. It was quite romantic-a telephone caJI from Munich, saying that a 
car would wait for me at the border to take me to Munich. I was told that this 
car could not come into Switzerland but would wait for me half-way between 
the French and the Swiss custom house, which a little bit frightened me. 
Although my bags were light, I did not know just what I would run into. Hap­
pily, as I arrived at the little border station on Lake Constance, two American 
boys in uniform grinningly greeted me. When I said, "How'd you get here," they 
replied, "We didn't think you'd like very well to meet us between the two 
custom houses; so we fuced it." A long single-track bridge connected the two 
custom houses; this bridge went over a branch of Lake Constance. It would 
indeed have been most uncomfortable to walk halfway across this bridge and 
stand waiting there in the broiling sun. 
After traversing the French zone, we drove through rural Bavaria in the 
American zone reaching Munich in the late afternoon. It was on the eve of 
the elections for the constitutional conventions which had been called for the 
thirtieth of June in each of the three states of Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttemberg­
Baden to debate and adopt a final constitution to be submitted to the people. 
The idea of Military Government was that I should spend as much time as 
possible with German leaders to determine what was in the back of their minds, 
in regard to these constitutions. Consequently, a meeting was immediately 
arranged with Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, the minister-president of Bavaria. There 
followed other sessions with the various members of his ministry \\,ho had 
participated in the preparation of the draft constitution. In Stuttgart, the capital 
of Wurttemberg-Baden, I did the same, but also participated in the meeting of 
the l.Aenderrat or Council of States. This organization was developed to enable 
the Germans in our zone to cooperate more fully. It was here that Secretary 
Byrnes made his historic speech. In Wiesbaden, the capital of Hesse, I found 
an old friend, Professor Karl Geiler, installed as minister-president. c;o the 
conferences with him and his associates were especially fruitful. At Marburg, 
a town with a famous old university where I grew up, I spent a little time with 
professors interested in the rebirth of democracy. There meetings were ar­
ranged by a brilliant and remarkable young American who recently, as you 
may have read in the papers, was killed, Ted Hartshorne. Ted had been 
engaged in denazifying the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt, and had 
done it with extraordinary success. In most of the universities a substantial 
number of the academic teachers had to be eliminated-in Marburg I think it 
was 60%, in Frankfurt 50%, and in Heidelberg 75%. All these scholars have 
been obliged to retire because they had been supporters of the Nazi regime. 
This "cleansing" has seriously disrupted higher education because the number 
of students is greater than before. We in the American universities trying to 
handle double the number of students with the �me staff can readily appreciate 
what this means. 
My next stopping point was Frankfurt, where our Military Headquarters 
1 
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are. The sight of utter destruction of the ancient city, which was the center of 
the Medieval Holy Empire was even more ghastly than I had seen in 
Munich, Stuttgart and elsewhere. In Heidelberg, my old Alma Mater, I again 
conferred with professors who had been engaged in the drafting of these con• 
stitutions. I also wanted to talk with some of the religious leaders among the 
clergy who had opposed the Nazis. I had an extremely interesting session with 
Dr. Martin Niemoeller in Frankfurt and with similar men in other places who 
are less well known internationally, but who, of course, knew their people and 
therefore could shed light on the popular interest, or lack of it, in framing 
constitutions. What I learned I shall report presently. Next came Franconia 
with the court at Nuremberg. In contrast to this utterly destroyed gem of 
medieval architecture, the beauty of Bamberg is hardly touched and the great 
cathedral towers above the medieval town in all its pristine splendor. There 
followed three weeks in Berlin worlcing at headquarters with the various divi­
sion chiefs and helping to draft a program for effective guidance of the German 
constitution makers. I also went into the French zone for a short trip and into 
the British zone for a little longer, seeing something of Hamburg and Hanover, 
as well as the Bremen enclave, which is jointly administered. I hope I have 
given you an idea of the itinerary and the ground I covered. 
Jt was a roost interesting and at the same time a rather upsetting trip. I 
don't mean merely the physical part of it, although I do believe if you have 
known Germany before it is impossible to imagine the condition of the country 
without going there and looking at it yourself. You can see pictures but pic­
tures do not add up to the mass of the impression. You take a Little town like 
Darmstadt, the former capital of Hesse--65,000 inhabitants, one fire-bomb 
attack of 20 minutes, 90% of the city destroyed, one-half of the people killed­
today, of course, just one vast desert with the people who remain living on the 
outskirts, trying slowly to work toward the inside. It is hard to realize what 
this destruction means in a city like Frankfurt. The entire interior of the city 
is in ruins. It was quite a task to find Dr. Niemoeller. He and his confessional 
church are installed in a building that was partly preserved but it stands within 
a sea of rubble. I shall never forget the face of the man who directed us. We 
were driving, of course, in our military vehicle, and I had the street address but 
I couldn't find any signs among all this rubble. As we turned I sort of leaned 
out of the car and saw a man coming up. He looked like an elderly official, 
worn but thoughtful. I said to him, "Where is Schlesinger Gasse?" He pointed 
to a pile of brick and replied, "That is where it was." As he said it, an unfor­
gettable, indescribable expression crossed his face. 
J also think it's rather difficult to appreciate the extent of mass starvation. 
There are, of course, now, some pretty adequate reports. For example, Anoe 
O'Hare McCormick in The New York Timer in a couple of columns in the 
4 See The New York Time1, October 1, 1946, p. 28. 
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last few days has given a very vivid picture of that mass starvation. The caloric 
content of the rationed food available throughout the British zone is a thousand 
calories; this is way below the concentration camp ration. That kind of a ration 
for people in a concentration camp is bad enough, but for miUions of people it 
becomes a pretty terrific proposition. There are quite a few people who argue 
that the Germans were responsible for the war and they have to pay for it. 
True enough. For even if we wanted to prevent misery, we could not ha,·e 
prevented it; they were bound to pay for their sins. But what worries the more 
conscientious Americans is that many millions are suffering as a result of mis­
takes we made, more especially giving our consent to expelling ten million or 
more Germans from their homes in the provinces annexed to Poland and Soviet 
Russia. Most of the well-intentioned Germans I talked with appreciate fully 
their own great share of responsibility. In fact, to some extent, it is even justi­
fiable to say that they welcome an opportunity for atonement. 
But has this not gone too far? Does it not threaten to jeopardize our 
policy of democratization? The e>..1:ent of economic disintegration and chaos is 
unbelievable. To illustrate it, I'll give you two little facts. You probably smoke 
cigarettes-quite a few of you do--and you probably never pay any attention 
to cigarette butts, but if you saved them-suppose you smoked ten cigarettes a 
day, which is not a terrible lot, that would give you 300 cigarette butts a month 
-and if you packed those 300 cigarette butts a month into a bag and shipped
them to Germany, that would provide the money for the sustenance of a family
of four, because each butt can be sold on the black market for three marks and
it takes 250 marks to keep a person going on rationed food. Another illustration
is provided by a bit that a friend of mine, Colonel William Dawson, head of 
the military government in Stuttgart told me.5 "You know that it's my 
misfortune that every time I go to Frankfurt I get the room in the Carlton
Hotel that faces out on the yard on which the back door of the Red Cross
kitchen also faces." I didn't know what he was leading up to; so I was quite
puzzled, and I said, "Why is that such a great misfortune?" He said, "'Because
in the evening all the cans that have been used during the day are dumped out
into the yard by the Red Cross kitchen, and at four o'clock in the morning a
swarm of emaciated women comes into this yard and starts gathering cans to 
get what little food is left in them to carry home. Every morning when I'm
there, they wake me up with the clatter, and I go there and look at them again
and my heart aches for them." Unless you face these conditions, you cannot 
appreciate the difficulty of democratizing Germany today.
Democracy, as you know if you remember the great depression, prospers 
?n _ 
full stomachs. This basic importance of food is not peculiar to democracies;
it 1s true of all regimes, but it is particularly true of democracies because each 
5 Colonel Dawson one of ti t t d" · · d G ci· d 
• . 1e ou s an mg m1!1tary government ofhcers we have ha inermany ie suddenly in February, 1947, of a heart condition caused by overwork.
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and every individual has a voice and can express his discontent. Therefore when 
our people first began to say, "You ought to make a constitution; you ought to 
come forward and organize yourself," many German leaders said, "How can we 
make a constitution? Our problems are food, housing, clothing. How are we 
going to get out people to go along?" But General Clay and his staff took the 
position that it was essential since for us democracy means constitutional 
democracy. 
There is a very clearcut and realistic issue involved. We swept away in 
Germany all vestiges of the established order. We were determined to get rid 
of the Nazis and we were also determined to get rid of the militarists. The 
Nazis at the end turned the government over to the militarists and whe1� the 
militarists tried to deal with us, we took them into protective custody, too. 
When that happened, then, for the first time in a thousand years or more there 
was no German government. I do not know whether you ever asked yourself 
how difficult it is to go into a foreign country and try to govern that country 
without having any native authorities to work for you. In Japan, we used the 
Emperor; we gradually changed the regime, but at any one time General Mac­
Arthur always had Japanese to speak to when he wished to address the Japanese 
nation. But our people did not have any Germans to address; they had to reach 
the citizens, a passive mass of ordinary men and women, directly. That, of course, 
could not go on forever. Some kind of German government authority had to 
be set up. Unfortunately, under the Four-power Allied Control Council, the 
four zones have each gone their own way and have evolved a system suitable 
to their masters. Naturally, since our people were committed to constitutional 
democracy, they insisted on constitutions. The western tradition of democracy 
and constitutionalism has been one of autonomous initiative. Constitutions have 
been made by people who fought for the right to order their own existence. 
That was the outlook, of course, of people who fought for independence in the 
United States and made the constitution of the United States; that was the 
outlook of the '48' ers who failed in Germany; that was the outlook of the 
French Revolution and of the various developments in France afterwards. Al­
ways, the constitutional development came as a part of the uprising of the 
people becoming self-conscious of its role and determined to achieve freedom. 
But in this situation, the Germans did not say, "We want a constitution." 
The Germans did not say, "We insist that you allow us to act freely according 
to our convictions." They were not in any position to do it. We had the 
military power; we laid down the Jaw; we said that any German criticizing 
military government is subject to arrest and punishment. This situation might 
in the course of time have led to a revolutionary development in Germany, but 
that time certainly had not arrived last spring. Instead we said to Dr. Hoegner 
in Munich and to Dr. Geiler in Wiesbaden and to Dr. Reinhold Maier, minis­
ter-president in Stuttgart-all three of them good democrats, presumably­
"The United States speaking through the military governor, request that you 
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appoint a constitutional commission to draft a constitution." And when these 
men said, as I told you before, "Is it 1101 a little early; ought we not to wait a 
little while?" We said, "No, we want you to go ahead." So they said, being 
good Germans, ··very well, if you wish us to do it, we will do it." And tliey 
went to work. 
Let me digress a little into ancient history here. There was a time when 
such changes in constitutions regularly followed defeat in war, especially during 
and after the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians always brought democracy with 
them, the Spartans oligarchy (aristocracy). Among the Greeks, the notion of 
constitutions as instruments, not results, of change went even farther. Plato 
sailed to Sicily in the hope of persuading the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius l, to 
liberate his people and to make them into the perfect commonwealth by organ­
izing a constitution. Unhappily, Dionysius I, who was a practical politician 
said, ""That's all wonderful theory, but it cannot be done." Plato was very dis­
appointed, but he had to acknowledge that all his magnificent thought came to 
nothing. You have dearly here the idea of the constitution as an educational 
force, as a formative force that is put upon a people from above to make them 
free. Later, some tyrants in other city-states did try to follow the Platonic 
pattern-they never succeeded but they tried. As far as our modern Western 
tradition is concerned, the idea that you can use the constitution as an educa­
tional force is a new and untried proposition. It is a revolutionary undertaking. 
Whether it will work or not nobody knows, but we are committed to it. We 
are unquestionably going to try to make it succeed. 
If the Germans knew as little about democracy as our official wartime 
propaganda pretended, I am quite satisfied that the enterprise would be fore­
doomed to failure, because we would not have anything to work with; we 
would have had to work out the constitution ourselves. We would have said, 
"Here it is; now live according to it," as Plato wanted Dionysius I to do. Ac­
tualJy our military governor could go to these three minister-presidents and 
could say, "Will you appoint constitutional commissions to prepare a prelimi­
nary draft?" And these Germans in turn could gather in others who had been 
active in constitutional life in Germany before the Nazis and request that they 
participate in this labor. As a result, the constitutions which were drafted by 
these commissions and which I had to analyze and discuss with the men who had 
been engaged in the job, very much resembled the constitutions of the Weimar 
period. They resembled the constitution of the Weimar Republic itself, and 
they resembled the constitutions of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and so on, which 
had had state constitutions during the Weimar period. 
Actually, the constitutional tradition in the states composing our zone goes 
much further back. This is particularly true of Wurttemberg which is very 
proud of its constitutional tradition. There are some people in Stuttgart who 
think they know a lot more about democracy than we do; and Colonel Dawson, 
who has worked with them, is not sure that they are not right. At any rate, 
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if you look at the commentaries written on the constitutions of Wurttemberg, 
when it was still a kingdom before 1914,-a constitutional kingdom like Eng­
land in 1800,-you find that many provisions that were in the constitution of 
the kingdom of Wurttemberg in the nineteenth century are found again in 
these constitutions. In sum, we are really reinforcing ideas that have been 
suppressed, and are giving them a chance to grow. We are, I might almost 
say, in the position of a gardener who is going into a flower garden in which 
the flowers have been all but crushed by weed growth, and we are pulling up 
the weeds, and giving the flowers a chance. 
In a way I was distressed by the extent to which these constitutions re­
sembled the pre-1933 constitutions. And I think that some very important 
lessons have not been learned. The final drafts we have now before us as they 
are going before the people to vote upon,* in my opinion are going to give both 
the Germans and the United States a lot of trouble, because they once again 
will require unstable coalition governments, such as always result from com­
bining the system of parliamentary responsibility with proportional represen­
tation. I don't want to go into these technical issues, but those of you who are 
students of government will probably agree with me that it is a very unstable 
type of government which has given trouble everywhere. It has been a major 
factor in the French crisis, and many Frenchmen wish to see it abolished. It 
works fairly well in some countries like Belgium and Sweden, when the king, 
who is the traditional representative of the country as a whole, acts as a balance 
wheel, a guardian of the constitution as it were. Perhaps in these German 
states in the American zone it may work because the military governor is in the 
position of the king. Maybe an American can somehow succeed in balancing 
the conflicting forces. But I am very much afraid, particularly in countries hke 
Hesse which are very evenly balanced between the parties that we are going to 
get the same kind of deadlock which discredited democracy in Germany before 
1936. 6 I wish that at least one of these states had been bold enough to experi­
ment with the Swiss or American system of a stable executive. I believe that 
the stable executive is better adapted to the German mentality; I think, also, 
that the stable executive is better adapted to the extraordinary conditions exist­
ing in Germany today. But the Germans adopted this unstable system. 
Another weakness, common to European constitutions, is the absence of 
adequate institutional safeguards for civil liberties, although they contain a 
, vigorous proclamation of such civil liberties. Curiously enough, the constitu-
* Ed. note. The constitution of Wurttemberg-Baden was ratilied in a popular refer­
endum on November 24, 1946. Bavaria and Greater Hesse ratified their coostitu­
stitutions on December 1st of the same year. Immecliatdy after the adoption of these coo­
stfrutions and the simultaneous election of new Land1t1ge in each state, American Military 
Government officials transferred responsibility for administration to the cabinets selected 
by these legislatures. 
6Unfortunately, the year 1947 now drawing to a close has already conJirmed these pre­
dictions; in each state there have been going on the bickerings typical of such co:ilition 
governments. 
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tions are equally emphatic about socialism. All three of U1ese constitutions are 
collectivist in their general meaning and significance. This is perhaps surprising 
because the constitution of Bavaria was fashioned· by an assembly that was pre­
dominantly composed of members of the so-called Christian-Social Union. It is 
a Catholic-Protestant party with a considerable conservative element in it al­
though it is by no means simply a conservative party since it also contains the 
leftist elements of the Christian trade unions. Yet Bavaria, although not quite 
as radical as the people in Hesse, nevertheless fashioned a constitution which 
provided for a system of extensive collective control. Combined with it, you 
have an explicit and emphatic recognition of the basic freedoms-freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, 
and so forth. Some special provisions are rather amazing: under the Bavarian 
constitution every Bavarian is guaranteed the right to hike in the open forest 
and enjoy the beauties of nature. 
I think you as students in a Women's College might also be interested in 
the fact that all three constitutions, but more particularly the constitution of 
Hesse, provide that the position of men and women is absolutely equal, that 
women must be paid identically the same pay for identical work as men, and 
that the work of the housewife at home must be recognized as the equivalent 
of a husband"s professional labors, and that any property accumulated by the 
family must be considered to belong equally to her as to him. Likewise, you 
might be rather startled to know that the Catholics, having a majority in Bavaria, 
included the same article in their constitution which the Hessians and Wurttem­
bergers also have, providing that the rights of illegitimate children are the same 
as those of legitimate children. The Bavarian Constitution incidentally makes 
it incumbent upon the state to take care of illegitimate children. 
After this brief survey, you may well wonder how these constitutions are 
going to work out. I, myself, consider them an unique experiment. Some 
Germans witl1 whom I talked tend to look upon their constitutions as bridging 
East and West. They say: "We cannot go back to the system of non-collectivist 
individualism that you Americans favor, but we also do not wish to go over to 
the totalitarian collectivism of the Soviet Union. We must find something in 
benveen, and therefore we want to try democratic socialism." That is exactly 
what they said in 1919; the idea is coupled with a number of expressions or 
phrases that are very peculiarly in the continental European tradition. The 
underlying conceptions are not particularly German, for you find them also in 
the Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland. Property is, of course, basic to 
socialism. All these constitutions say something like this: "The right of private 
property is guaranteed, provided the property is not noxious to the community. 
Particularly, the right of the people is guaranteed in property which they have 
acquired as a result of the labor of their own hands." At the same time, all 
three of
. 
the constitutions say: "Property constitutes an obligation toward the 
community, and any violations by property owners of this duty toward the
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community justify the community in collectivising the property." Whether 
such an approach can be effectively combined with the maintenance of civil 
liberties as we understand them remains to be seen. If you are familiar with 
the discussions that are going on today in England and in France, you will know 
that in both these countries, people are moving in this direction; even a con­
servative Jike DcGaulle has come out for the necessity of a measure of collectiv­
ism. You will recognize that this democratic socialism is what a short while ago 
we idealized as Sweden's "middle way." In Sweden's program cooperatives are 
of central signiiicance. In all the three German constitutions cooperatives are 
not only recognized but are put under the special protection of the community. 
Now you may say, "Well, all this is done possibly just to please the 
American conqueror." I don't think so. Apart from the earlier historical roots 
to which I have referred, I happen to have here a document which our people 
found when they dug into the background of the Putsch of 1944; it's a private 
copy that was used by the Nazis in convicting one of the men who was hanged 
as a sequel of the Putsch of July 20, Cad Friedrich Goerdeler, a very prominent 
man. And if we had time here, 1 could translate for you sections of this docu­
ment, written before 1944, which expound almost verbatim the ideas which 
have now found expression in these constitutions.7 In the very midst of the 
war these opposition elements tried to clarify what the future might require 
and they hit upon this kind of a compound of ideas. That does not mean suc­
cess is assured, even psychologically, and there are a number of reasons why 
that is not so. For one thing, a great deal depends upon what we do. If we 
ourselves show lack of respect for constitutional procedures, through violation 
of civil liberties and the like, we cannot hope to increase respect for them 
among the German people.a If we continue to allow the German economic 
situation to deteriorate by preventing them from working, if we de-industrialize 
beyond the point at which the Germans may become self-supporting-and this 
means a very extensive foreign trade for rump Germany since it will have to 
import 50% or more of its food-if we discredit and humiliate the democratic 
elements in Germany, we will completely fail in our policy of democratization. 
Another serious obstacle is the indifference among the masses of the people 
7The document here referred to is a memorandum by Cad F. Goerdeler; since this lec­
ture was given a full discussion of it and other related matters has been published by 
Allen W. Dulles in Germany' J U11dergrou11d ( 1947). 0. also the report of the Morale 
Division of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey entitled Effects of Str.itegic BombiJ1g 011 
German Mort1/e, 1946. 
SSince this was said, American military government authorities have made a very real 
effort to have all occupation personnel become aware of this aspect. General Clay him• 
self has repeatedly spoken of it in addresses to our military and civilian personnel. The 
new directive issued July 15, 1947 and superseding JCS 1067, likewise states: "As a 
basic objective of the occupation is the reestablishment of the rule of law in Germany, 
you will r{'(Juire all agencies under your control to refrain from arbitrary and oppressive 
measures ... You will protect the civil rights of persons detained under rharges ... "
(Section lld). 
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resulting from preoccupation with the daily struggle for existence. When you 
lack the essentials, like food, housing and clothes, constitutional liberties become 
shadowy and unreal. Remember the New York taxi driver in 1932 who shouterl 
at a passenger: "I can't eat liberty." When I went to see a number of clergy­
men, including Dr. Niemoeller, to find out whether the people in his congre­
gation had put their shoulders behind the wheels of constitutionalism, Dr. 
Niemoeller said, "Frankly, we have not thought of it. This is the first time 
this problem has been brought forcefully to my attention." I said, "Well, don't you 
think that freedom of religion is an important consideration today, considering 
what has been happening to you under the Nazis?" "Well," he said, "you are 
right." "Don't you then feel you ought to do something to arouse the people?" 
"Yes, we should, but we haven't thought of it." Thus in spite of the elections, 
much indifference and ignorance concerning the constitutions was prevalent. 
We hoped to reduce this indifference by submitting these constitutions to a 
popular referendum; the idea was that the average German would become com­
milted to the ideas contained in the constitutions by either saying "Yes" or 
"No." But the unrelieved struggle for survival has continued to hamper our 
constitutional effort. 
A third factor affecting constitutional development is the activity of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, as I said at the outset, bas its own ideas as 
to democracy. They are "democratizing" their zone, but they are not doing 
what we are doing. They are building a Soviet pattern of community. You 
know, probably, that they bad a referendum last spring in Saxony to allow the 
people to approve of the collectivization of certain industries. But the contrast 
of the two zones can be overstated. The Soviet Union held the referendum on 
the collectivization of the coal mines .first, but because of what is happening in 
our zone, they are now following suit in  having popular elections, and I would 
not be at all surprised if in the course of next spring they decide that they also 
must have constitutions fashioned in their zone for their five states.9 These 
elections were held, however, without adequate freedom of speech and assembly 
and one major party, the Social Democrats, were entirely forbidden to carry on, 
thereby removing the major competitors of the Communists. Thus although 
the Soviet Union and we came at it from opposite poles, we do to some extent 
meet in the middle.IO 
A fourth factor that I think bas to be borne in mind trying to evaluate 
the future of German constitutionalism is the extremely complex and unfortu­
nate pattern of quadripartite government. I have reserved that topic to the 
9 As mentioned in footnote No. 1 the states in the Soviet zone adopted constitutions soon 
after ours. These constitutions follow the pattern of the rejected French constitution 
of 1946 which was the result of a compromise between the Communists and the 
Socialists. 
10 Unfortunately, the USSR have since severely aggravated the situation by developing the 
so-called Soviet A.G.'s-monopolistic industrial enterprises under Soviet control. 
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end. I shall frankly tell you that the government which today is operating in 
Germany is the most complicated and cumbersome government that I have ever 
encountered in my twenty-five years of work as a student of comparative gov­
ernment. I believe if someone had sat down trying to devise a government that 
would not work, this is the sort of scheme he would have hit upon: to have a 
government which is territorially divided into four parts, unrelated to any 
pre-existing boundaries, each supported by the remnants of a real fighting army, 
with a council composed of the commanding generals of each of these four 
armies on top, capable of acting only by unanimous vote. Each of these gen­
erals is then subject to his own government, governments of very different out­
look and method and pursuing divergent policies. It has become the fashion 
in the United States to blame the Soviet Union for the breakdown, but we too 
have blocked action, and our policy makers are as responsible as the others for 
the crazy-quilt pattern of quadripartite government and the zonal boundaries. 
I think if we succeed in operating that government-that "quadripartite" gov­
ernment compounded of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, 
France, and the Germans- ! think everyone will be obliged to take his hat off 
to the ingenuity and patience of man in accomplishing the impossible. 
There is a fifth factor obstructing the growth of constitutional democracy 
in Germany which has to be borne in mind. It brings me to the end of my talk. 
In spite of all that has happened, there are many Nazis left in Germany. We 
have denazified; perhaps we are the only ones who have really energetically 
denazified. I gave you the illustration from the universities, and one could 
quote similar figures from other fields of activity. But these people are around, 
and even though the worst malefactors are going to be in labor camps, they are 
going to be there only five years or ten years, then they are going to come out 
( many, however, will be deprived of their vote). In this connection I ought to 
tell you one thing that surprised me more than anything else, perhaps, in my 
wanderings about Germany, and that is the fact that every German with whom 
I talked said, "You must stay and continue to occupy the country." I'd say, 
"How long?" and they would reply, "As long as is necessary." When I would 
ask, "How long is it necessary" they would answer, "Maybe fifteen years, 
maybe twenty years, maybe twenty-five years." I asked, "Why?" because after 
all when I first heard it, the idea amazed me. They replied: "Because if you 
left Germany there would be civil war." In other words, you see, the entire 
social structure has become so basically upset, and underneath this order main­
tained by force there are so many causes for chaos, that unless someone sits on 
top of this structure, benevolently or malevolently, but at any rate sits on top 
of it, it will fall to pieces. 
Let me give you just one illustration. When we turned the denazi­
fication over to the Germans, and the law that was made provided for 
denazification boards in each town, before which these presumed Nazis 
were to appear in order to be adjudged, it proved extremely difficult to man 
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these boards. They are now staffed, but it was a long-drawn-out struggle. Time 
and again, people, good people, people that we believed in, people that had the 
right kind of ideas, said, "Well, friends, pick somebody else. Why? Well, I 
don't know whether you are going to stay. If you leave, I'll be strung up on a 
tree. I'd rather live; find somebody else." And there were a lot who said, 
"Why don't you do it? Why ask us.to do it? We can't do it." In short, the 
fifth difficulty is that you have the remainder of the Nazi element as a persistent 
disturbance, and there is going to be plenty wrong for those fellows to make 
hay of, to agitate and to get people excited about. 
Yet, in conclusion, I will confess to you that I am somewhat more hopeful 
now than when I went over. When I went, my state of mind was one of utter 
despair. But I must say that as I watched the scene, I recaptured some hope, 
for in the midst of all the destruction you find human beings who are rebuild­
ing in faith, not only constitutions, but churches. I stood in the center of 
Nuremberg, which is completely destroyed, and talked with a little team of old 
stone masons who were chopping away at their work; they bad rebuilt three 
columns of their fifteenth century church of which only the entrance was stand­
ing. When I said to them, "What are you doing here?" they carefully explained 
to me in detail just where they were going to get this stone and when that arch. 
As they displayed the old blueprints I finally said, "How long do you think 
it will take you to rebuild this church?" They said, "Well, perhaps twenty 
years, twenty to twenty-five years. If you stay twenty or twenty-five years, that 
church will be rebuilt." That church in a way became in my mind a symbol of 
the whole situation. These men realized that they must rebuild the basic center 
of life. Until it is done someone has to stay around to keep a measure of order. 
They can rebuild the foundations, but it will take time. 
By way of an epilogue, may I remind you of the common cultural heritage 
which binds us to the Germans. Think of Beethoven; his Ninth Symphony,
which nobody who has any feeling for music can ever forget. It culminates in 
the immortal choir, "Be Embraced All Ye Millions," based on a poem of 
Schiller. This is music and poetry. But think also of Immanuel Kant. He 
wrole the most penetrating philosophical analysis of the peace problem. If you 
compare the charter of the United Nations with Kant's essay Eternal Peart
you find that the charter of the United Nations is a step toward the ful.611ment 
of his dream.11 To me there is something deeply touching in the thought of this 
little wizened man in far-away Konisberg, projecting a reign of eternal peace 
in 1795. He was old and he had been living a life of provincial seclusion in 
his native East Prussian city. Yet in this essay he knocked down one by one 
the foundations of the mighty Prussian kingdom. And in his mocking, ironical 
way-he was a timid man, you know-Kant requests the statesmen who look 
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IV. 
VARIATIONS OF THE LIBERAL THEME 
Bv ALPHEUS THoMAs MAsoN
"'Catchwords and labels," Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo observed in 
1936, "are subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and must 
be watched with circumspection." 
I submit that liberalism, perhaps our most cherished of current creeds, is 
subject to the dangers against which Cardozo warned us. Liberalism, like 
democracy, is now a power symbol, a political catchward, an imperial slogan, 
and as such of limited usefulness in intellectual discourse. Today nearly aU 
men, regardless of formal party or creed, are professing liberals, while the con• 
servative is almost an extinct political species. Conservatism, once more than 
respectable political theology ( especially among the educated), now carries over­
tones of reaction well nigh as discrediting as the rabidities attributed to com­
munism. 
This confusion in political doctrine has been particularly marked since 
1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated his far-Bung, manysided legis­
lative program to win for all men, here and now, the more abundant life, and 
soon thereafter the four freedoms, "everywhere in the world." Roosevelt led 
his campaign under a liberal banner, but his strength and zeal promptly stimu­
lated "liberal" protest, provoking counter-moves that mustered against him 
high-ranking members of his own party. Thus the lords and magnates of the 
American Liberty League, harking back to liberalism of earlier vintage, saw 
New Dealers overthrowing the very fundamentals of our country's tradition. 
Roosevelt was embarked, they clamored, on bold courses that would surely 
destroy the principles under which "we have prospered as has no other nation 
in the world." The League, pretending to be wholly cleansed of any corroding 
self-interest and calling itself "absolutely non-partisan," began forthwith to 
teach its own brand of liberalism. 
Yet Liberty League spokesmen in 1934 merely echoed Herbert Spencer's 
dogma of 1884, namely, that there is and can be only one measure of liberty­
the "paucity of restraint" which go11ernmenl in any form imposes on human 
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freedom. Electoral acceptance of Roosevelt's reform program thus embodied 
and empowered an ideological triumph of extraordinary significance, a revolu­
tion in outlook, in theory, the most far-reaching and enduring of all revolu­
tions. The New Deal successes mark a break with the longest and deepest line 
of the modern American tradition-that of rugged individualism-the dogma 
that identifies individualism with laissez-faire, and considers liberty as possible 
only in a society relatively free from government controls. Inequality, according 
to this theory, is the price society pays for liberty; inequality, that is to say, 
results inevitably from liberty. Whether liberty results inevitably from ine9ual­
ity was not made quite dear. 
Some time after 1933, the national government in all branches, including 
the Supreme Court, endorsed quite a different theory. Suppose we call the new 
approach pragmatic or positive - positive because it holds that government 
intervention does not necessarily war with liberty. Government, it is contended, 
must create and recreate anew the conditions requisite for freedom, and must 
at times enter fields normally the domain of private enterprise so that urgent 
social services may be supplied. Under the complexities of industrialism, of 
highly organized group interests and self-defeating conflicts, liberty is possible, 
we are told, only if government be the dominant power. "New conditions," 
Mr. Roosevelt said in a campaign speech of 1932, "impose new requi.rements 
on government and those who control government." 
But the contrast between Old Deal and New Deal theory is less sharp 
than these observations may imply. The difference consists largely in the 
values deemed fundamental and the relation of government thereto. Edward 
S. Corwin puts it this way:
"Under the democratic system there are two possible conceptions 
of what a government ought to be doing, provided neither is pressed 
to a logical extreme. One is that government ought to preserve an 
open field for talent and not disturb the rewards which free compe­
tition brings to individuals. The watchword of such a government 
will, of course, be Liberty. The other theory is that government ought 
to intervene for the purpose of correcting at least the more pronounced 
inequalities which are apt to result from the struggle for advantage 
among private groups and individuals. The watchword of such a 
government will be Equality." 
Old Dealers, failing to take into account the fact that liberty is often 
infringed by forces other than government, stress the absence of governmental 
restraint as the true measure of freedom; New Dealers, sensitive to the blighting 
effects of modern economic forces on equality of opportunity, hold that govern­
ment must intervene to safeguard and protect the individual against them. 
Franklin Roosevelt, stressing equality, extended enormously the theory of 
positive government, but he did not originate it. The New Deal in fact repre­
sents the resumption and culmination of various popular crusades dating from 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the masses, recently enfran-
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chised, began urging use of government as an instrument for protecting and 
advancing their social and economic welfare. 
Before 1850 Democracy, in the sense of manhood suffrage, had been, so 
to speak, on the make, and industrialism still in its early phases. But in Fortun 
Magazine, November, 1889, a big New York lawyer, T. G. Shearman, said 
that "the United States is practically owned by less than 250,000 persons." By 
1919, he said it would be controlled by "fewer than 50,000 persons." Shear• 
man recognized that business had already begun to crystalize into the structure 
of corporate and super-corporate monopoly. 
Still other forces emerged: labor awakened and organized; populists and 
socialists, grangers and greenbackers had their fleeting hour. The masses were 
manifesting the disinclination De TocquevilJe had foreseen in the 1830's­
their refusal "to remain miserable and sovereign." For the evils of industrial­
ism, they sought far-reaching corrective legislation at both state and national 
levels, setting in motion congeries of movements and ideas. 
The upshot was that Americans, sometime before 1900, were confronted 
with the dilemma so sharply posed by Daniel Webster in the Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention of 1820. "The freest government," Webster had 
said, would not long be acceptable if the tendency of the laws were to create 
a rapid accumulation of property io few hands, and to render the great mass 
of the population dependent and penniless. In such a case," Webster continued, 
''the popular power must break in on the rights of property, or else the influ­
ence of property must limit and control the exercise of popular power." 
In these words Webster had projected in dear, perhaps oversimplified 
form the strangely disordered course liberalism has taken during the years since 
about 1870. We see political power widely diffused, economic power organized 
and concentrated presenting precisely the issue Webster had anticipated. A 
strangely confused panorama of aggressive, exploitive, and militant forces then 
introduced a new and revolutionary period. ExtensiYe political and philosophi­
cal realignment was in order; interests formerly united were now divided; con­
servatives turned liberal as erstwhile liberals became conservative. In due cour:;e, 
however, all these varied and conflicting movements invoked as its own the 
fair and comprehensive name liberalism. 
Among the numerous and divergent currents flowing into the broad river 
of ideas we call liberalism, the most clamorous was the torrent of the reformers.
Itself the confluence of many separate, and sometimes antagonistic streams,
reformist liberalism held that new and strange forces were subjecting liberty to 
unprecedented peril, that governmental power could no longer be confined to 
the narrow bounds of police. Democracy must now press on against the rise of 
wh�t _H�ory Demarest Lloyd called "industrial Caesars.'' Lloyd was overl)'
optim1st1c as to the outcome. "In making themselves free of arbitrary and
corrupt power in government, the Americans," he said, "prepared themselves
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to be free in all else, and because foremost in political liberty they l1ave the 
promise of being the first to realize industrial liberty." 
Other groups, less bold in outlook than Lloyd-Grangers, Greenbackers, 
Henry Georgites, Knights of Labor, Populists, etc.,-also favored, in varying 
degrees, enlisting government in freedom's war against new tyrannies. For 
all these crusaders as for their spiritual followers today, enlargement of liberty 
by means of government, popularly based, was the very essence of liberaJism. 
And yet it was this same popular power, emancipated and organized, a 
truly liberal force in the minds of its leaders, that stimulated strong counter­
currents. Edmund Burke, a century earlier, had anticipated why mass revolt 
must be a most ominous fact for men of property. "Liberty," he said, "when 
men act in bodies is, power." Now for the first time in our history "mere num­
bers", "over-bearing majorities", "factions"-that dreadful spectre most feared 
by the founding fathers, and the force they painstakingly tried to curb became 
crucial in our politics. And when legislatures, under the stimulus of popular 
crusades. began to "break in on property", lawyers and judges were conspicuous 
among those proclaiming their genuine liberalism against so "spurious" a 
blend of mere popular power. Suppose we label these legalist guardians of 
freedom-stat11s q110 liberals. I can mention only a few of their number, but 
these may be considered as typical. 
Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley of Michigan, known for his treatise on 
Comti/11/ional Limitations, alerted the legal profession to the alarming poten­
tialities of Jacksonian democracy. "By far the larger part of all doubtful legis­
lation," Cooley said (in an article of 1878, published in the Pri11ceto11 Re,•iew), 
'"which the history of the country presents has taken place since the year 
1846, when radical ideas began to be characteristic of State constitutions, and 
the theory that officers of every department should be made as directly as pos­
sible responsible to the people after short terms of service was accepted as a 
political maxim." 
Against this threat of popular power and the ''doubtful legislation" result­
ing therefrom, Judge Cooley noted two safeguards: Such legislation was 
enjoined by the Constitution, if properly construed. And what did proper 
construction entaiJ? Fixity and stability-in short, maintenance of the stalt1s
quo. "If principles are not fixed and permanent," he wrote, "they are not 
Constitutional, and may be suspended or overridden to suit the passion or 
caprice of the moment." 
Regulatory legislation was also doomed as violating the law of "supply 
and demand"-higher law, natural law. Denouncing current violations of this 
natural law, Cooley recalled that attempts to regulate wages and prices during 
the colonial period were abandoned when the "wise men" of the time "were 
brought by observation and reflection to the conclusion that there were laws 
determining prices which were inherent in the nature and circumstances of 
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civilized society, and that the operation of these laws was not likely to be 
improved by legislative interference." 
Once again the guiding rule was statm q110. Furthe:rmore, any deviation 
from the limits set by this higher law of economics on the scope of legislative 
power imperiled "free government " itself. "It is not to be understood," Cooley 
asserted hopefully, ··to be now pretended that any general right to fix the price 
of commodities or to limit charges for services can exist as a part of any system 
of free government." And Cooley was prepared to stand by his own peculiar 
brand of "free government " even in a situation where a commodity or service 
had become monopolized. "Does . . . the mere fact," he inquired, "that one 
owns the whole supply of anything, whether it be of a certain kind of goods 
or of a certain kind of service, confer upon the state the authority to interfere 
and limit the price he may set upon his wares or bis services ... Suppose in 
some state," Cooley continued, "a single individual should own the only mine 
in the country of some metal important for use in mechanical arts, would it be 
competent for the state, on the ground that competition with him was impos­
sible, to restrict at discretion the price he should be able to charge for it? ... 
Who ever shall undertake," Cooley replied defiantly, "to answer these questions 
in the affirmative should be expected to show how the power may be har­
monized with the general principles of free government." 
This is precisely what Chief Justice M. R. Waite had sought to do two years 
earlier, 1876, in the leading Supreme Court Case of Muno vs. Illinois, that is, 
he had tried to harmonize price-fixing in businesses "affected with public 
interest"' with principles of free government. Waite had reasoned that if a 
state of facts could exist which might conceivably clothe a business with a 
public interest so as to justify price-fixing, the court must assume that they 
did exist. And still further, the chief justice declared flatly that if persons 
( owning property in which price-fixing was deemed appropriate) felt that 
the rates set were arbitrary and unreasonable, they should, under well-estab­
lished principles of free government, "resort to the polls, and not to the 
courts." Leading lawyers, however, bitterly attacked Waite's principles and 
framed contradictory doctrines of their own-that is of slaJ11s quo liberalism 
-and urged them with increasing insistence and, in time, successfully on the
courts.
Frederick N. Judson, a leading member of the St. Louis Bar, continued the 
war against reformist liberalism in a full-length address of 1891 before the 
American Bar Association. Judson saw dearly that all this government regu­
lation, abridging the right of free contract, "must tend generally to increase"
and that this was liberty's only peril. "The vice of so-called social legislation,"
�e said, "denying freedom of contract, is that it deprives the individual of bis
pers?nal ri�hts' and subjects him to the only tryanny which in this democratic 
�ge_ 1� possible . . . -the power of the state exercised in the abridgement of mdividual liberty." The menace especially to be combatted was as our ancestors
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knew, the sheer force of numbers, whether embattled in the ranks of labor or 
represented in legislative bodies. Judson summed up the issue: 
"Social and economic conditions ... within the past few years . .. 
have forced into public and judicial discussions, as never before, the 
relation of the fundamental rights of the individual to the police 
power of the State. It is now not the question of what constitutes 
'due process of law' but the limits of State authority in the exercise 
of the legislative discretion as to the requirements of the public wel­
fare, in abridging the citizen's liberty, or denying him the use of his 
property, without any process. 
The stress of competition in business, the prevailing social unrest, 
the distinct trend of a certain class of social agitators in the direction 
of State socialism, the superstition that legislation is a sovereign cure­
all for social ills, and last, but by no means least, the competition of 
reckless politicians for the unthinking vote, all are potent factors in 
inducing legislation, which is forcing upon the attention of our pro­
fession and the courts a new class of constitutional questions, and 
signs are not wanting that these are to be the weighty questions of the 
future in jurisprudence, as well as in social economics ..... 
Judson was no less sure of the remedy than of the evil. The bar, he said, 
entertained "one simple rule about industry, that it should be free"-free from 
social legislation and immune from coercion by organized labor. 
The very next year, 1892, John Randolph Tucker, distinguished as a law­
yer as well as for his commentaries on the Constitution, carried on the campaign 
especiaHy deploring paternalistic panaceas-"that organic malady which destroys 
the Constitution itself." And Tucker, like Cooley and Judson, reminded lawyers 
of their special task "to safeguard society and the Constitution" against labor 
demagogues and doctrinaire reformers. Let Tucker portray the ominous threat 
of reformers to our free institutions: 
"In such a condition of affairs as confronts us, when Paternalism 
offers to furnish anything to its offspring which ignorance or caprice 
or greed may demand, parties in their zeal to win power play upon the 
popular unrest, the result of misfortune, disaster or bad legislation, to 
suggest panaceas for the diseases of the body politic. The press teems 
with the proclamation of these medicines for a sick country. Believe 
me, most of these will bring no cure; but many will breed the worst 
disease which can come, that organic malady which deslrop the con­
stitution itself! For that there is no cure!" 
What, then ought to be done? What was the truly liberal remedy? 
"Better throw physic to the dogs," Tucker recommen_ded. "Purge 
the patient of the poison with which quacks have filled him, ... The 
young Hercules will recover if left free from the paterna� d_oct?rs1 towork out his cure by his own self-reliant efforts and _ his mvmoble 
energy. Unbind his limbs; nurse him no longer; let him walk, leap, 
and run his career of immortal and God-ordained destiny, for his own 
glory and for the advancement and elevation of the human race ." 
"The evils which infest and menace our country in the close of 
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this dying century," Tucker went on, "will be crushe� by the free and 
unbounded and independent manhood of the Amcn�an people, un­
helped and unhindered_ by the . pateri:ial care of their go�ernmen�.This must be done or liberty will perish. It shall not pensh ! This 
work shall be done and the supreme law of the land shall regain its 
paramount title. 
"Brother lawyers of America!" Tucker exhorted vigorously. "In 
all ages, our profession has furnished the trained and skilled cham­
pions of right and justice, of liberty and !aw. Don your a_rmor. Set 
knightly lance in rest. Demagogues dende and would discard you. 
The schemes of Paternalism allot you only, disinherison. [sic] ... 
Though a disinherited knight, the American Bar enters the lists as 
the champion of Institutional liberty under Constitutional guaranty. 
We boldly strike the shield of the proud Ternplar of misrule, and 
challenge his power. We will not, cannot, must not, fail. The Con­
stitution in its integrity must be restored; political heresies must be 
exorcised, and our free institutions must be perpetuated." 
Implicit in all this is the unique American theory that the Constitution and 
principles of "free government" are entrusted exclusively to safekeeping of the 
bar. Ordinary men outside the ranks of the "priestly tribe" had placed un­
hallowed hands on the sacred ark of the covenant. Thus President Edward W. 
Phelps of the American Bar Association had noted in his annual address of 
1879 that ·•the Constitution had become more and more a subject to be hawked 
about the country, debated in newspapers, discussed from the stump, elucidated 
by pothouse politicians and dung-hill editors, by scholars in the science of 
government who have never found leisure for the graces of English grammar, 
or the embellishment of correct spelling." 
To the American Bar, Phelps argued, is committed "the safekeeping of 
the Constitution. The lawyers of today are the judges of tomorrow. It is by 
your discussions, in the light of your writings, by the aid of your labor that 
every successive question that arises touching the fundamental law is to 
be adjudicated . . . The lawyers' influence is great," Phelps said; "their 
influence upon the public mind, upon political sentiment. It is from them 
that the true spirit of the jurisprudence of the country on all subjects-and 
above all on Constitutional law- must of necessity emanate. It is they who 
make it; it is through them that it must take effect." 
But the truth is that the lawyers' principles of "free government" were 
then (1879) on the defensive. Certain Supreme Court judges have indeed 
g�ne so far as to say that lawyers' principles afforded evidence of "some strange
misconception" of a broad power vested in the judiciary to "frustrate the legis­
lative will." But Justice David J. Brewer of the United St:ites Supreme Court 
?1ade it clear which way the judicial winds were blowing in 1893 when he 
interrupted his judicial labors to discuss before the New York State Bar Asso­
ciation "Movements of Coercion", i.e., organized-labor and the current legis-
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lati"e effort to regulate rates in public utilities. Justice Brewer, taking account 
of the exigency, and of current theories of popular powers, came out strongly 
for judicial intervention. Here is what he had to say: 
"The great body of judges are as well versed in the affairs of 
life as any, and they, who unravel all the mysteries o[ accounting be­
tween partners, settle the business of the largest corporations and 
extract all the truth from the mass of sciolistic verbiage that falls from 
the lips of expert witnesses in patent cases, will find no difficulty in 
determining what is right and wrong between employer and em­
ployees, and whether proposed rates of freight and fare are reason­
able as between the public and the owners; while, as for speed, is 
there anything quicker than a writ of injunction?" 
A year later (1894) William Howard Taft, then Federal Circuit Court 
judge of Ohio, suggested the use of military force against labor, as President 
Hayes had done in the Pittsburgh ''riots" of 1877. Commenting on the Pullman 
strike of 1894, Taft said: 
'"The situation in Chicago is very alarming and distressing and 
uotil they have had much bloodletting, it will not be better. The situa­
tion is complicated by demagogues and populists. Word comes 
tonight that thirty men have been killed by the federal troops. Though 
it is bloody business, everybody hopes it is true." 
Next day, however, the future President of the United States and future 
Chief Justice was discouraged: 
"The Chicago situation is not much improved. They have only 
killed six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an im­
pression. 
Underlying stat11s-q110 liberalism, as Taft made baldly apparent, was a new 
version of a very rugged old idea-natural law. This higher law, re-enforced 
by the then prevalent Darwinian principles of evolution and survival of the 
fittest, interpreted as the Constit11tion, its eternal essence and verity, and within 
the exclusive safekeeping of the American Bar, placed very definite restrictions 
on what government could do. Justice Brewer put it this way: "It is the un­
varying law that the wealth of the community will be in the hands of a few," 
that •·rich men are essential even to the well-being of the poor." Lawyers and 
judges thus envisaged plutocracy as part of a universal process that held all 
nature-including our own-in its grip, a cosmic process sweeping mankind 
on, willy-nilly, to some far-off, and presumably good, certainly inevitable end. 
Mandevil1e's "Fable of the Bees" clothes statm-q110 liberal thought in these 
satirical lines: 
"No Bees had better Government, 
More Fickleness, or less Content: 
They were not rul'd by wild Democracy; 
But Kings, that could not wrong, because 
Their Power was circumscrib'd by Laws." 
But the laws of plutocracy were curiously paradoxical, being conceived as 
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binding on all save the privileged classes themselves. Universal law did not, 
for example, prevent endless governmental intervention in the form of protec­
tive tariffs. It did not block judicial use against labor of that speed-breaking 
device-the writ of injunction-or even the use of military force. The courts 
freely interposed judicial power as a barrier against both social legislation and 
against the power activities of labor. James Bryce, in the 1883 edition of his 
American Commomvealth, commented on this quaint contradiction in slat11s-q110
liberalism, saying: "One-half of the capitalists are occupied in preaching laissez. 
faire as regards railroad control, the other half in resisting it-in tariff matters 
-in order to protect industries threatened with foreign competition. Yet they
manage to hold well together." And so they did, being sure that any shift from
legislating for the few to legislating for the many, any transfer of emphasis
from their pseudo laissez-faireism to a social philosophy which takes cognizance 
of human welfare and social justice would reverse the very current� that were 
sweeping them, and of course the nation on to permanent prosperity.
The economist, Henry R. Seager and the industrialist, George F. Baer 
staled this eternal evasion of privilege: "It is his (the economist's) confident 
expectation," Professor Seager observed, "that men will grow better as condi­
tions of their economic life become pleasanter; and his belief (the economist's) 
that they are destined to grow better in no other way." President Baer, report· 
ing in 1905 to his Reading Railroad stockholders, took the same stand: "In the 
long run, these troubles (those growing out of the anthracite coal strike) will 
be settled not by demagogues but by the Christian men to whom God in his 
wisdom has entrusted the destinies of this country." The inference is that 
politics is non-existent, and government action, ( except against interlopers, or 
in the form of bounty or protective tariff), is unnecessary to win the new 
economic paradise. 
But the more realistic Webster had known better in his day; be knew that 
when popular power began "to break in" the "influence of property" would 
find political ways and means of neutralizing that effort. What he, perhaps, 
had not anticipated was that the power-hampering formulae would turn out to 
be a judicious and judicial fusion of providential decree with Darwinian 
Constitutional principles. It is doubtful, too, whether he foresaw the insur­
mountable nature of this property barrier. Commenting specifically on the 
peculiar status of property in the United States, President Arthur Twining Had­
ley of Yale, wrote in 1908: "I will not go so far as to say, that this set of 
constitutional limitations on the political power of the majority in favor of the 
political power of the property owner has been a necessary element in the suc­
�ess of universal suffrage in the United States, but I will say unhesitatingly that 
it has been a decisive factor in determining the political character of the nation 
and the actual development of its industries and institutions." 
"'This theory of American politics has not often been stated," Hadley 
concluded slyly. "But it has been universally acted upon, ... The voter is 
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omnipotent within a limited area. He can make what Jaws he pleases, as long 
as thore laws do not trench upon property rights. He can select what officers 
he pleases as long as those officers do not try to do certain duties confided by 
the Constitution to the property holder. Democracy was complete as far as it 
went, but constitutionally it was bound to stop short of social democracy." 
President Hadley's point, as I interpret it, is this: The Constitution relies 
upon and sanctifies sta/11s-q110 liberalism; it therefore absolutely precludes social 
democracy-the central objective of any truly reformist liberalism. It also 
ignores the most elementary tenet of any truly conservative creed-''A consti­
tution without the means of some change is without the means of its own 
conservation." Hadley's words remind one of the sentiments etched into the 
bronze plaque that hangs in Kirby Hall of Civil Rights, Lafayette College: 
"This Hall of Civil Rights is the gift of Fred Morgan Kirby to provide facili­
ties for instruction in the Anglo-Sa.xon ideals of the true principles of consti­
tutional freedom including the right of a man to own property and do witb it 
as he will ... "
Reformist liberalism and statm-q110 liberalism, in the extremes at least, 
appear to be headed toward altogether different goals: one is moral and spir­
itual, the other material and mundane. Edward Bellamy, as exponent of the 
former, emphasizing man's well-nigb infinite capacity for cooperation, envisaged 
new environmental conditions as capable-without change of human nature­
of creating a more tolerable world in which determination of man's needs would 
not turn on the quantity of material goods he produced but on ··the fact that he 
is a man." One observes in Bellamy's literary fantasy the meditative silence 
that seized Dr. Leete on being questioned as to "wages." There was no wage 
equivalent in this imaginary world of 2000 A.D. because, as Dr. Leets ex­
plained, "Desert is a moral question, and the amount of product a material 
quantity .. . The amount of effort alone is pertinent to the question, desert. 
All men who do their best do the .rame." 
And in Bellamy's imaginative world, men were driven to do their best, 
not because of the prospect of material gain but because of the forthcoming 
"badge of distinction"-that is, because of public recognition. Industrialists 
and their lawyer-judge adjuncts, on the other hand stressing man·s competitive 
instinct, saw material gain as the sole drive of human activity. Consider what 
Justice Henry Billings Brown had to say concerning human motivation in his 
''real" world of 1892: "The man who writes books, paints pictures, moulds 
statues, builds houses, -pleads causes, preaches sermons, or heals the sick, does 
it for the money there is in it; and if, in so doing, he acquires a reputation as 
an author, painter, sculptor, architect, jurist, or physician, it is only an incident 
to his success as a money-getter. The motive which prompted Angelo to plan 
the dome of St. Peter, or paint the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel was essentially 
the same as that which induces a common laborer to lay brick or dig sewers." 
We turn now to the more philosophic kind of liberalism-the aloof sophis-
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tication and ··enlightened skepticism" implicit in the thought and work of Mr. 
Justice Holmes. 
Holmes was sensitively aware of all the pressures and drives of industrial­
ism-the political turmoil, the cultural crudeness, the rise of self-seeking cor­
porate power, the emergence of trade unionism, the threat of communism. He 
looked it all over with cool equanimity. For him neither the growth of business 
combinations, nor of labor unions, was unmitigated evil; both must be accepted 
as the outcome of the natural, inevitable working of the laws of social develop­
ment and change. He was about equally distrustful of reformist liberals who 
believed that by "tinkering with property we could have women free and a 
piano for everyone," and of stat11s-quo liberals who thought they could fix so­
ciety forever in a constitutional straightjacket. The Brewers and their like on 
the Court he sketched as "naive, simple-minded men," needing "education in 
the obvious," education that would enable them to "transcend their own con­
victions'' and thus allow that which "we hold dear to be done away with short 
of revolution by the orderly change of law." 
Holmes discerned the stubborn negativism so characteristic of privilege, 
the shape and set of mind, as de Tocqueville once expressed it, that make men 
"refuse to move altogether for fear of being moved too far." Holmes also 
understood the blinding zeal that so often afflicts reformers-the "upward­
and-onward-fellows," he called them. Lacking any certain measure of truth, 
Holmes could not join social movements nor enlist in public causes, even if 
judicial office had not precluded such activity. Not being God, as he was 
accustomed to say, he could neither follow those whose passion for reform was 
greater than his nor agree with "simple-minded" colleagues who belived they 
could block change and maintain the status quo. "To rest upon a formula," 
he said, "is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." 
Holmes' liberalism was a by-product of an ingrained skepticism that man­
ifested itself in relativism: "I am so skeptical as to our knowledge about the 
goodness and badness of laws that I have no practical criterion except what the 
crowd wants. Personally I'd bet the crowd, if it knew more, wouldn't want 
what it does; but that is immaterial." 
Relativism, rejection of the absolute, pervades Holmes' thinking on econ­
omics, ethics and politics, "I know no way of finding the fit man," he said, 
"so good as the fact of winning in the competition of the market." That is 
why Holmes could admire such men as James J. Hill, .the railroad magnate. 
That is also why he could denounce the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as "bumoug 
based on economic ignorance and incompetence," and describe the Interstate 
Commerce Commission as "an unfit body to be entrusted with rate-making." 
''When I say a thing is true (summing up his approach to ethics) I mean 
�a� I _can't help believing it ... I therefore define truth as the system of my hm.Jtahons and leave absolute truth for those who are better equipped." 
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''Truth," he wrote iu a Supreme Court opinion, "is the power of thought to get 
itseli accepted in the competition of the market of ideas." 
Relativism was likewise basic in his politics, but here it resulted in a kind 
ilf absolutism. In sharp contrast with his "'naive" colleagues, he recognized 
that legislatures rather than courts represent "'the actual equilibrium of forces 
in the community. What proximate test of excellence," he asked, "can be 
found except correspondence ... that is, conformity to the wishes of the domi­
nant power?" ··such conformity," Holmes admitted, "may lead to destruc­
tion, and it is desirable that the dominant power should be wise. But wise or 
not ... the test of a good government is that the dominant power have its 
way."' Herein lies the clue to Holmes' widely heralded liberalism in politics. 
Basically it meant that the might of the majority, even though it embodied a 
public policy he distrusted, spells right. "I have no practical criterion except 
what the crowd wants." 
Justice Holmes showed no sensitiveness to the danger of inaction, no 
marked inclination to shape social forces constructively. All of which sug­
gests that his famed liberalism must be measured primarily in terms of rare 
open-mindedness as to matters wherein most lawyers and judges were singuJarly 
obtuse. 
How does Justice Brandeis fit into this variegated liberal pattern? What 
sets him apart? What is the secret of his great power and enduring influence? 
Brandeis is, of course, known among his friends as a great liberal and 
roundly denounced by his enemies as a radical. Neither label fits. There is 
not, to my knowledge, any evidence that the Justice himself accepted either 
tag as a correct description of bis social and political outlook. Brandeis thought 
of himself as a democrat with a little "d". He campaigned for ··good causes" 
without the slightest regard for practical politics or tenderness for any phil­
osophical system. He worked indiscriminately and simultaneously with labor 
leaders, captains of industry, trust magnates and trustbusters, muckrakers and 
academic scholars. 
No formal political organization could count implicitly on his allegiance. 
He supported Theodore Roosevelt with enthusiasm, and in 1908 voted for Wil­
liam Howard Taft, anticipating that he would "be a good President, rather 
of the Cleveland type." He broke with Taft in 1910 and with T. R. in 1912. 
In the latter year he campaigneq actively first for Robert M. Lafollette, and 
later switched to Wilson. In 1920 he was "100 per cent," as he put it, for 
Herbert Hoover, and when the Old Guard passed over the "great engineer" 
to elevate Hardjng and Coolidge, Brandeis deplored it as "a sad story of Amer­
ican political irresponsibility." In the face of such a record, is it any wonder 
that critics, including some friendly ones, are not quite sure what place, if any, 
to assign Brandeis in our liberal constellation? 
In the rough and tumble of his pre-judicial struggles, Brandeis was usually 
on the popular, progressive, or reformist side, on the side of labor and the 
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consumer. But be was no blind champion of the underdog. As long as it was 
a matter of one corporation against another, where the lawyers on two sides 
were fairly well balanced in competence, he was content to practice law in the 
more conventional way. But when a corporation achieved enough power to 
end competition or hold labor or the consumer or the public hopelessly within 
its grip, "a very different question presents itself." Under these circumstances 
one could not fairly assume that the "two sides are reasonably well matched," 
or that a decision will be reached such "as justice demands." 
"I cannot conceive," Brandeis wrote in 1905, "of anyone being really 
sensible who was not a reformer as well as earnest and progressive." But be 
must be carefully distinguished from the conventional saviors of society. He 
did not fare forth with fire and sword to win Utopia. Brandeis does not fit 
neatly into Holmes' category of "upward and onward fellows." Talcing men 
for what they now are and can be, not for what they ought to be, he dealt 
with particular evils at given times and places as these came to light in the 
natural course of his law practice. Unlike so many raucous muckrakers then 
flourishing, he did not, "by hating vices too much come to love men too little," 
even though those men were unconscionable capitalists. Nor was he content 
merely to expose and deplore. For known wrongs he proposed a knowable 
remedy and worked systematically and tenaciously toward its elucidation and 
enactment. 
Brandeis sympathized with the rise of popular power and was much im­
pressed by the quality of thinking then ( 1905) being done by working men. 
Many of them, he said, talked about the labor question "far more intelligently 
than some of the most educated men in the community." Social unrest could 
not therefore be safely or effectively brushed aside as the outcropping of mass 
envy and iniquity; nor should social legislation be summarily declared unton­
stitutionaJ, nor labor activities put down harshly by bloodletting or a writ of 
injunction. Brandeis never concurred in President Hadley's caveat that the Con­
stitution enjoins social democracy. Yet he, like other "corporation lawyers," 
recognized the explosive nature of popular power, and the danger implicit in 
it for men of wealth like himself. He foresaw as early as 1905 that "immense 
wealth would in time develop a hostility from which trouble will come to us 
unless the excesses of capital are curbed." "Our country," be warned, "is, after 
all, not a country of dollars but of ballots; the working men must in a com­
paratively short time realize the power which lies in them." 
And Brandeis, like Cooley, Judson, Tucker, and Brewer, pointedly re­
minded the bar of its peculiar responsibility. All were equally cognizant of 
the socialist peril. But whereas the conventional corporation lawyer traced this 
danger straight to agitators, muckrakers, and labor leaders, Brandeis saw in­
dustrial magnates themselves unwittingly aiding the socialism they deplored: 
"The greatest factors making for communism, socialism and anarchy among 
a free people are the excesses of capital. The talk of the agitator does not ad-
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vance socialism a step, the great captains of industry . . . are the chief makers 
of socialism." The lawyer-judge reactionary outlook recalls Burke's words of 
1790-"I must bear with infirmities until they fester into crimes." Brandeis 
knew that such blindness was as self-defeating in the America of 1905 as it 
had proved to be in the England of 1790. 
Brandeis, appraising the situation at the turn of the century, saw the rise 
of popular power and trade unionism as the natural outcome of a changing 
social order. Power was moving from the few to the many. Lawyers and judges, 
if wise, would not try to freeze privilege and indiscriminately thwart change; 
nor was it prudent or even safe to stand aloof from the struggle, as Holmes 
was inclined to do, ready and willing to apply the measure-"what the crowd 
wants." Here, Brandeis thought, was a signal opportunity for lawyers-"the 
richest field,"' as he put it, "for those who wish to serve the people." It lay 
within their power to determine the course of political and social action, "to 
determine whether it is to be expressed temperately or wildly; whether it is 
to be expressed in lines of evolution or in line of revolution." Believing this, 
Brandeis left the beaten track of trust-belt lawyers, abjured the Olympian de­
tachment so typical of Holmes, not to battle solely for the people ( in the sense 
of the underdog), not to undermine our time-honored institutions. He inter­
preted his function as that of safeguarding society against blind change as well 
as against blind opposition to change. His was the constructive task of canal­
izing human aspirations for freedom into law and orderly progress. 
The evening of Brandeis' judicial career came in the first decade of Pres­
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Justice strongly sympathized with certain 
New Deal objectives, and was deeply involved in the effort to implement them, 
but he was not a 100 per cent New Dealer. He joined in setting aside NIRA, 
among other measures, and on more than one occasion vehemently doubted 
whether grandiose plans and a few fallible planners could achieve genuine free­
dom and self-government. Even when F. D. R.'s program was in its _first and 
more glamorous phases, the Justice mingled skepticism with sympathy. In early 
January, 1934, for example, he noted with approval that Washington was the 
scene of "more intellectual striving than I have ever known," but in quotation 
marks he added these lines: 
"The world's wise are not wise 
Claiming more than mortals know." 
Brandeis was concerned lest the curse of "bigness" which had been so 
long the characteristic malady of business might also afflict government. After 
1934, his letters to personal friends exhibit the same sort of skepticism toward 
bigness and unrestrained power in government, and in organized labor, as he 
had earlier voiced against the evils of industrial giantism and monopoly. 
"What," he was wont to ask, "do they (New Deal administrators) know about 
the practical problems of business?" Nor did the rising power of labor elicit 
his unqualified approval. Many years earlier he had said, and now repeated: 
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"Society gains nothing in substituting the tyranny of labor for the tyranny of 
capital." As he continued to affirm and reaffirm his faith in little men and 
littJe institutions, and to voice distrust of the uncommon man, the big man, 
some erstwhile friends--induding even ardent New Dealers--began to think 
of him as outmoded, wanting to turn the dock back. 
The most obvious practical quality that sets Brandeis apart from the en­
tire miscellany of American liberals was his inductive, factual approach and, 
as a direct result, his amazing grasp of economic and soCJal complexities. His 
moving knowledge would not allow him to condone the status q110 or assume 
Holmes' attitude of detachment. Brandeis had to take sides; knowledge of 
the facts of our economic and social situation alone was cakulcated to create 
in him a sense of militant urgency. Uncanny premonitions that mao·s failure 
to solve today's problems accentuates and complicates tomorrow's issue, drove 
him to take a resolute stand in favor of social control as against the anarchy 
of greed and private economic power. That is why his writings and opinions 
are alive with deep conviction. Thus_ Holmes might uphold legislation be­
cause the '"crowd" wanted it and the Constitution did not prevent it, whereas 
Brandeis might uphold it or set it aside depending on whether the statute 
conformed to certain standards of social justice as established by the facts.
And for Brandeis' measure of facts, Holmes expressed the utmost confi­
dence and respect. 1t was Holmes who proclaimed that "the man of the 
future is the roan of statistics and the master of ceremonies." lt was Holmes 
who said that .. every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics." 
It was Holmes who warned against any "slackening in the eternal pursuit 
of the more exact"; it was Holmes who spoke of the futility of arguments 
on economic questions by anyone whose "memory i s  not stored with economic 
facts." It was Holmes who asserted that "it is the essence of improvement that 
we shouJd be as accurate as we can." 
But Holmes' interest in "the more exact" was only verbal. For the factual 
studies in which Brandeis reveled, he frankly expressed fastidious disrelish. 
Holmes talked much of wanting to "improve his mind," and toward the end 
of the 1919 term of court, Brandeis told him precisely how he could do it. 
"Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with reference 
to my summer occupations," Holmes wrote Sir Frederick Pollock, May 26, 
1919. "He said you talk about improving your mind, you only exercise it 
on the subjects with which you are familiar. Why don't you try something 
new, study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in Massa­
chusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently, you can go to Lawrence 
and get a human notion of how it really is. I hate facts. I always say the 
chief end of man is to form general propositions-adding that no general 
pr�position is worth a damn. Of course, a general proposition is simply a
str1ng for the facts and I have little doubt that it would be good for my im­
mortal soul to plunge into them, good also for the performance of my duties, 
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but I shrink from the bore - or rather I hate to give up the chance to read 
this and that, that a gentleman should have read before he dies .... " 
Thus, while Holmes read and reread the philosophers Hobbes and Plato, 
Brandeis studied "some domain of fact"-facts as the accumulating evils of 
unemployment, the abuses of industrial life insurance, the paralyzing effect� 
of long hours and bad working conditions. And he did more than amass 
factual ammunition about specific wrongs. Firm in his belief that knowledge 
is power, he went out on the firing line and fought for specific remedies­
and not infrequently won. 
Brandeis could not find ease in Holmes' citadel of "enlightened skeptic­
ism." Holmes savoured what be called the "secret isolated joy of the thinker." 
Brandeis' greatest joy was in the thick of social and economic conflict. He was 
the self-styled man who "would rather fight than eat." And as a "man of statis­
tics and master of economics," Brandeis could measure the perilous consequences 
of inaction. Knowledge moved him to constructive social action against eco­
nomic privilege and greed. When most of our lawyers were either smugly 
complacent or eager only to preserve the status q110, a profound sense of urgency 
moved him to guide and direct "the power that lies in·the masses." Informed, 
conservative impulse, not radicalism, drove him to find remedies for human 
suffering and exploitation. Masterful command of industrial and political com­
plelCities generated in him moral voltage so conspicuously lacking in to the 
liberal Holmes, in the reactionary Taft. 
Brandeis' mood was militant because he knew in his own time what none 
of us can fail to see now, that public ignorance and apathy ("the greatest peril 
to freedom") in the face of unresolved social and economic conflicts is an 
open invitation to authoritarian rule, that failure to solve today's problems com­
plicates tomorrow's issues-worse still, that failure dangerously narrows the 
range in which man is free to shape his own destiny. 
Brandeis realized as did few, if any, of his contemporaries, that liberty 
is a many faceted thing, that the forces that hedge it in are manifold and 
changing, that liberty cannot be reduced to any economic or political formula. 
Thus the worker whose best effort barely wins a livelihood is not free. Those 
who go through life in aimless search for pleasure, who live solely to impress 
others or to win their approval, are not free. The corporation execut;ve whose 
thought is merely of profit and more profit is thereby enslaved. The lawyer 
whose life is spent showing corporations how they can evade the law is him• 
self enchained. The politician bent on office and power is not his own man but 
his electorate's or his party's. In short, no man is free if personal ambition 
masters him. 
For Brandeis' liberty does not consist merely in emancipation from things 
�t exp!oi�, dwarf, and enslave Liberty is essentially positive and expresses 
itself prmc,pally in spiritual growth, in terms of the individual and his de­
,·elopment. The social and political organizations under which men Jive are 
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good only as they facilitate that development by enlisting individual participa­
tion and responsibility in matters of common concern. Therefore, Brandeis 
could say with John Stuart Mill: "The worth of a state, in the long run, is 
the worth of the individuals composing it, and the State which postpones the 
interests of their mental expansion, and elevation to a little more of admini,­
trative skills, . . . a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they might be 
more docile instruments in its hands, even for beneficial purposes,-wi!l find 
that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished. 
In due course, Brandeis discovered for himself the further truth, which 
he held to be applicable generally-that by participating in and assuming re­
sponsibility for specific public causes, he enjoyed a keen sense of duty done, 
of liberation-an enlargement of his own freedom. 
That is why Brandeis' statesmanship (or liberalism, if you will) must be 
measured by stands taken, things done. Believing that nothing in this world 
is inevitable--neither democracy nor freedom, neither peace nor war-Bran­
deis joined movements, labored in behalf of specific reforms. In his youth­
ful notebook he had written Bacon's words: "In the theatre of human life 
it is only for God and the angels to be spectators." Even as a Supreme Court 
Justice, he was still the fiery crusader, the "moral teacher," demonstrating his 
belief that man does have considerable control over his own destiny, proving 
to the very end that given knowledge, leadership, participation, and persist­
ence, man can approach nearer than was ever thought possible to an enlarg• 
ing liberty through a Jiving law. 
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